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Introduction

Neal P. McCluskey and Jason Bedrick
Andrew Coulson’s career in education policy, tragically ended by
brain cancer in February 2016, was not long. Andrew was only 48 years
old when he died, and his crusade to vastly improve education was his
second calling. As you’ll read in this volume, Andrew had been part
of other groundbreaking work before entering the world of education
policy. That success could easily have led a less driven, less caring
person to rest on his accomplishments and retire early. Instead, he took
on a new challenge. And while Andrew’s years relentlessly pushing to
transform moribund, government-dominated education were short, his
impact was great. He packed a lifetime’s worth of energy, and many
decades worth of thought, into the all-too-limited time he had.
We both had the pleasure of working with Andrew—technically for
Andrew, but it never felt that way—when he was the director of the
Cato Institute’s Center for Educational Freedom, and Neal worked with
Andrew even before that. Indeed, Neal recalls the early days of a debate
Andrew sparked in the early 2000s, when Neal was a neophyte policy
analyst at the Center for Education Reform. Andrew was the most outspoken advocate in the country for delivering school choice through tax
credits rather than vouchers, and his declarations of their superiority
touched off friendly but spirited debate. In 2001, when he was a senior
research associate at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Andrew
released a Cato Policy Analysis making the case for tax credits, “Toward
Market Education: Are Vouchers or Tax Credits the Better Path?”
Truth be told, in our early days, we both preferred vouchers to tax
credits. Neal even said as much in his Cato job interview. He wanted
credit- and deduction-free flat taxes, and what libertarian could disagree with that! But in the context of education policy, Andrew helped
persuade Neal that scholarship tax credits were the better way to go.
Andrew got his start in education policy with his book Market
Education: The Unknown History. As the title suggests, the book laid bare
the history of education that many advocates for public schooling have
1
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not wanted us to hear. Previously, people such as leading progressive
educator Ellwood Cubberley had written education histories that made
it seem like humanity’s evolution ebbed or flowed exclusively on the
degree to which government supplied education. In contrast, Market
Education showed readers that, historically, education did not require
government provision. Indeed, people consumed abundant and much
more effective education in times and places in which free people—not
the government—controlled learning. Driving this message home—
that leaving free people to work voluntarily with one another is the key
to educational excellence—was at the core of everything Andrew did
in education policy, including his work on tax credits, his examinations
of educational productivity, his preschool education commentary, even
his work on terrorism and madrassas.
Ultimately, Andrew worked to maximize human flourishing, and
he knew that goal requires freedom in education. In the process, he either touched off, or contributed mightily to, lots of education policy
debates. Despite Andrew’s powers of persuasion, of course, many of
those debates continue, but they do so greatly enriched by Andrew’s
contributions. In this book, several people who knew Andrew well—
including some who sparred with him from time to time—reflect on
those contributions and carry on some of those crucial debates.
In the first chapter, Bob Bowdon, founder of the indispensable website
ChoiceMedia.tv, writes about Andrew’s life, including the job Andrew
had before diving into the ocean of education policy. Let’s just say for
the moment, Microsoft founder Bill Gates has taken a big personal—
and financial—interest in education. Do we know who might have put
a bug in his ear?
In the next chapter, former Cato Institute education analyst Adam
Schaeffer offers a full-throated defense of scholarship tax credits, the
school choice mechanism that Andrew most ardently championed.
Then, George Clowes, senior fellow at the Heartland Institute, takes
issue with Andrew’s preference for credits over vouchers, continuing a
friendly debate that has gone on for years. Following that, Jason Bedrick
reconsiders Andrew’s views on the constitutional and policy dangers of
public funding as they pertain to the latest arrow in the school choice
quiver, education savings accounts. Can this type of publicly funded
account withstand legal challenges that vouchers could not? And might
their design mitigate Andrew’s concerns about the potential for public
funds to bring harmful regulations?
2
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Moving to the bigger picture, Jay Greene, head of the Department
of Education Reform at the University of Arkansas, joins Jason in
discussing Andrew’s historical work, the work that put Andrew on the
education policy map.
The last three chapters address Andrew’s ultimate goal for school
choice—a full, free market in education. The first of these is by James
Tooley, professor of education policy at Newcastle University and author
of the award-winning Cato book, The Beautiful Tree: A Personal Journey into
How the World’s Poorest People Are Educating Themselves. Years ago, Andrew became fascinated with James’s accounts of his world travels and
his discovery of abundant for-profit schools in many of the poorest parts
of the globe. James’s chapter discusses his findings, Andrew’s friendship, and the need for free-market education throughout the world.
But how do we measure freedom in education? Trying to figure this
out was a project that Andrew undertook with incredible zeal, eventually resulting in the Cato Education Market Index, a metric for scoring any
education system according to the degree to which decisions were made
centrally, or by individual parents and educators. John Merrifield, an
economist at the University of Texas at San Antonio, was an adviser on
the Market Index project, and he thinks there is a better way to measure
the market orientation of a system: his own Education Freedom Index.
Anyone desiring a better education system should engage in this debate.
In the last of the policy chapters, Neal McCluskey discusses what
he considers the most important—but overlooked—reasons that school
choice is essential: freedom of conscience, equality, and social harmony. Andrew recognized, and wrote repeatedly, that public schools—
“democratically controlled” government schools—are inherently unequal, with majorities, or powerful minorities, deciding what every
child will or will not be taught. But Andrew did not say that any choice
solves the problem: vouchers, too, encroach on conscience rights. As
Andrew argued, the best way to maximize freedom and educational
equality while minimizing coercion is through tax credits.
The book concludes with a number of moving testimonials penned
soon after Andrew’s death by people who worked with, knew, or just
knew of Andrew. This outpouring began within hours of Andrew’s
passing, and we are honored to be able to reproduce so many powerful
memorials here.
Andrew Coulson may no longer be with us physically, but his ideas
endure.
3
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1. Getting to Know Andrew Coulson
Bob Bowdon

In 1994, a Microsoft software programmer with four and a half years
on the job arranged a meeting with his manager. At the appointed
time, without much small talk, Andrew Coulson offered a letter of resignation. Surprised, the manager asked why he was quitting. Equally
surprising was Coulson’s answer (as retold later by Andrew’s wife,
Kay). Andrew said to his boss, “I’m leaving because of you.”
Many managers might gird themselves at such a moment, anticipating an unseemly string of critiques and complaints that could flow from
the mouth of a departing employee suddenly free from the need to keep
up appearances. But that was not about to happen. Instead, Andrew
said, “I can see that you love your work. It brings you joy, fulfillment,
and you just love what you do. I don’t have that. I want to go find something that I love.” Those who knew him can imagine the earnest, naked,
forthright face he must have offered at that moment.
Microsoft didn’t completely fail Andrew in the love department.
Through that job, he met a young Cincinnati native named Kay
Krewson, a Microsoft software tester who would become his wife. But
just as he followed his heart with Kay, he wanted to follow his heart
professionally.
It bears mentioning that in his resignation, Andrew didn’t quit just
any job. He quit The House that Bill Built, a company that arguably
defined modern technology and business dominance of the era.
Many periods in American business are associated with one juggernaut company and its killer product. In the 1910s, it was Ford Motor
Company and the Model T. In the 1960s, it was IBM and the System/360.
In the first decade of the 21st century, perhaps it was Google and its
search engine. But in the 1990s, that juggernaut company was undisputedly Microsoft, and its product was a little something called Windows.
This was the professional rocket ship from which Andrew Coulson
voluntarily disembarked. As a developer working on the famed
Windows 95, Andrew was tossing away a job that millions of people
would have clung to for dear life, for both the professional prestige
5
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and the potential financial windfall it could ultimately bestow. Looking
back, however, those who knew him best understand his choice. Most
rugged individualists with the gift of irrepressible optimism simply
aren’t cut out to be company men, and neither was this one.
In fact, the seeds of his next endeavor had already been planted. A
few years earlier, Andrew had read with interest about a public referendum in neighboring Oregon to amend the state constitution. The
ballot initiative called for interdistrict school choice, which would have
let parents send their children across the imaginary political lines called
“school districts,” and it would have let families declare private school
tuition costs as credits against taxes. “Clearly, that will pass,” Andrew
thought. “Slam dunk. Piece of cake. Put a fork in it.” That was, until
two-thirds of Oregon voters rejected the initiative.
The result puzzled him. Why on earth would Oregonians make the
oxymoronic choice against choice? What could motivate people to get
in their cars and drive to a polling place to stridently reject their right
to make a decision—especially one affecting the lives of their children?
The conundrum stayed with Andrew, and a few years later, the newly
emancipated young programmer returned to this perplexing question—
thus changing the course of his professional life.
Andrew Joseph Coulson was born May 4, 1967, in the Canadian province of Quebec, the fourth child of Violet and Donald Coulson. They
were an iconoclastic family from the start, as native English speakers
marooned in a French-speaking province. Despite the language barrier, it didn’t take long for the neighbors to get to know Andrew. At
either five or six years of age, he decided to offer a bouquet of flowers
to his mom for Mothers’ Day. Driven by both generosity and a young
child’s sense of creative problem solving, he promptly cut off the tops of
flowers from yards all around the suburban neighborhood, assembled
them to the best of his pint-sized ability, and presented the bounty to a
delighted Mrs. Coulson. After thanking her son, she was immediately
curious about his source of the raw material, as most mothers might be.
The revelation led to a multistop floral apology tour that the neighbors
understandably found charming.
Andrew’s high school years involved French horn during the school
year and sailing in the summertime on the lakes of Quebec. And while
anyone hoping to be accepted at the highly competitive McGill University
6
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Getting to Know Andrew Coulson

as a math major needs absolutely superb grades, older brother Stuart says
that Andrew was much more than a good student during his adolescence.
He was always curious, always cheerful, and always good company.
Presumably, if your eyes are moving across these words, you already
know that Andrew Coulson very much did fulfill the quest he laid
out during his Microsoft resignation: to find professional work that he
loved. By 1999, he had published his landmark book, Market Education:
The Unknown History. It examined education through the ages and across
continents and found that when families spend their own money on
schooling, just as with everything else, they get better results than when
someone else spends money on their behalf. The volume was hailed
by no less than Nobel Prize–winner Milton Friedman as an “unusually
well written and thoroughly researched book.”
Market Education was potent enough to get the attention of the
Mackinac Center for Public Policy, which eventually hired Andrew as
their senior fellow in education policy. He was good enough, in fact, that
they hired him without requiring him to move to Michigan. A few years
later, the Cato Institute hired him as director of the institute’s Center for
Educational Freedom. Again, he was good enough that they hired him
without requiring him to move to Cato’s Washington, D.C., home.
To begin to understand Andrew Coulson, however, is also to understand his irreverent, absurdist, and playful sense of humor. How many
think tank analysts went to see the 2002 movie Jackass not once, not twice,
but three times in the theater (accompanied by their wives, no less)?
Andrew did. What other nationally respected policy experts developed
a hobby of detonating plastic bottles, an activity that Andrew’s friend
John Nesby called “the glue that bonded our relationship”? Nesby, a
professional chef and neighbor of the Coulsons, said, “We would shoot
BB guns; we would light firecrackers off. Then we would get a little bit
more extreme. We used to make dry ice bombs out of plastic bottles, dry
ice, and water, and then we’d shoot them with pellet guns and make big
explosions. It was just an absolute riot for a couple of grown men to be
running around in the woods after a hard day’s work, with a glass of
chardonnay or a craft beer in hand and blowing stuff up.”

In 2014, a 47-year-old Andrew Coulson worked out in the gym above
the garage one day and afterward came out to talk to Kay. He told her
that he got a weird taste and smell in his mouth. The sensation was
7
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strange enough that he thought he should tell her about it, in case it
turned out to be something important. After a couple of days, he got the
weird taste and smell again. Then it started to happen more frequently.
Within four weeks of the first sensation, he began to get headaches,
severe enough that he would lie in bed, unable to work despite continuous dosages of Tylenol.
First, the doctor said it was allergies and suggested he treat his symptoms with nasal sprays. When he went back to the doctor, the diagnosis
switched to sinus infection, and he was prescribed antibiotics. Soon
the pain was bad enough that he started vomiting. Kay took him to an
emergency room where they did a CAT scan. That led to the next wrong
theory—a brain infection—and a prescription for an MRI at a different
facility. Only then did the correct diagnosis finally emerge, a grade 4
glioblastoma. Andrew, with his wife by his side, was told that the life
expectancy for a person with his type of brain tumor is 15 months. The
news of a terminal prognosis came about six weeks after the first symptom, during a regular treadmill workout.
Many people, no matter what stage in life, would be understandably
depressed by the ominous news. But this man was not. You can talk
to Andrew’s widow, brother, and close friends. You can ask his professional colleagues. And if you knew him, you can review your own
correspondences with him over the course of 2015. There’s simply no
account of futility or bitterness or nihilism. There’s not even a coarsening or no-more-time-for-bullshit toughness. Andrew Coulson, as the
end neared, stayed funny.
Also absent were grand gestures and end-of-life reconciliations.
Andrew and Kay did talk about going back to Hawaii “one last time,” but
there was no discussion of a bucket list. Such late-hour recalibrations, it
seems, aren’t necessary for the people already leading the life they want.
Even his last few months of Facebook entries reveal an irrepressible
spirit. The majority of the posts don’t pertain to his illness. In one, he expressed relief that he’d learned which brand of yogurt had become the
official yogurt of the National Football League. In late December, when
Hillary Clinton extemporaneously said that she, “Wouldn’t Keep Any
School Open That Wasn’t Doing A Better Than Average Job,” Andrew,
with about six weeks to live, summoned the strength to post, “Garrison
Keillor please call your office.”
The posts that referred to his illness were also spirited. On
December 17, 2015, he wrote, “Just had my 37 millionth blood draw
8
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and saw a sticker on a table that suggests cancer patients aren’t the only
ones who get ’em. . . . It read ‘Alleged Father.’”
Two days later, Andrew had a stroke. A few days after that, he
posted, “Brain tumors being so 2014 I decided to try on a stroke for size.
Definitely new and different. For the time being immobilized on my left
side.”

This was the Andrew Coulson that resonated with countless people
who met and knew him. Thomas Shull, his colleague at Mackinac,
might have summed it up best when he wrote in a blog post, “There
was no one I enjoyed working with more than Andrew—a sentiment I
suspect all his friends and coworkers share. . . . He was a good man, and
he will be missed by virtually everyone who knew him.”
While most of us don’t like to think about it much, we’ll all have to
leave this world someday, perhaps before we think it’s our time, perhaps without finishing everything that we’re working on, and perhaps
leaving loved ones who’ll miss us dearly. When that day comes, may
we all say goodbye with as much grace as Andrew Joseph Coulson.

9
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2. Tax Credit–Funded Choice:
Reform for “Transformationists”
Adam B. Schaeffer

Great scholars tend to have a few things in common: they tend to
be inordinately productive, creative, and influential with those who
follow them in their field. Andrew Coulson was all of those things and
much more.
Coulson contributed to our understanding of education systems and
policy in many ways, but I think his greatest contribution was his development of a comprehensive argument for the superiority of tax credits
for funding educational choice and achieving the goals of the school
choice movement. He promoted education tax credits because he kept
in mind the most important factors in building a real, sustainable market for education: (1) locating financial responsibility at the source of
the funds; (2) avoiding and overcoming legal challenges; (3) avoiding
market-killing regulations; and (4) ensuring positive, short- and longterm political dynamics.
I should make an explicit note here about the purpose of this chapter.
There are, very broadly speaking, two kinds of education reformers—
those who seek the total transformation of the education system and
“tweakers.” Coulson was in no way the latter. He was not one to spend
his time considering minor adjustments to the current system. Transforming a massive industry, one woven into the fabric of our nation and
its politics, is not an easy task, and it will not be accomplished without
many small steps along the way. But the goal of choice advocates such
as Coulson and myself has always been a broad and deep shift in how
the education system functions. This chapter is written for those who
want to transform the system, not tweak it. It is a review of the reasons
a “transformationist” should greatly prefer the use of tax credits, rather
than government money, to fund educational choice.
My first introduction to Andrew Coulson came when I was in graduate school, in 2004. I’d written an article for National Review Online on
vouchers. Using a recent West Wing episode as a lead-in, I argued that
11
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conservatives and Republicans should use school choice as a wedge
issue among Democrats, pushing targeted vouchers to woo minority
voters. Someone working in the choice movement wrote to compliment
me on the article but gently suggested I might be missing some important concerns about school choice policy. He attached a late draft
of a paper Coulson had written for the Mackinac Center: “Forging
Consensus.”1 I read it, and that was it. In terms of practical impact, principle, public opinion, politics, regulations, and legal barriers, he made
a thoroughly convincing case for consensus on what the goal of school
choice proponents should be.
Coulson’s work directly inspired my PhD dissertation, examining
how school choice messages and policies interact, and I ultimately went
to work for him at the Cato Institute. It is no exaggeration to say that
everything I have written on education reform since then has been a
recapitulation or extension of Coulson’s thinking and analysis.
Much has changed since that seminal paper was published, but the
case Coulson laid out holds up remarkably well. Indeed, much of the
evidence has grown stronger in support of education tax credits over
vouchers or government-funded education savings accounts (ESAs)
as a mechanism to fund choice in education and ultimately build a
dynamic market in K–12 education.
A key point to keep in mind regarding Coulson’s work is this: he
believed the goal of the school choice movement should be to build
a robust, dynamic education market. The goal should not be to help
just low-income kids, or children with disabilities, because the children
who need help the most will be best served by a free-market education
system that continually adapts and improves. A large, free, dynamic
market with a wide range of choices will improve educational and life
outcomes for all children, most of all those most in need.
Coulson laid out much of the rationale for his vision of the ideal educational system in his seminal book, Market Education: The Unknown
History.2 In the book, he made his case not just deductively from libertarian first principles, but inductively, from a review of the history
of educational systems and theories that was surprisingly broad and
deep at the same time. Following Market Education, Coulson spent years
making the case for education tax credits as the best policy mechanism
for establishing a true market in education.
Recently, ESAs have become very popular. The idea is to establish
savings accounts and use the money deposited in those accounts—
12
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and the funds that accrue over time—on education expenses. The
funding mechanism has become associated almost exclusively with direct government payments into the ESAs. This approach has much to
recommend it, but the advantages of using tax credits to fund school
choice remain. The source of and mechanism for funding education is
of great importance, for both short- and long-term outcomes.3
In the remainder of this chapter, I will review the key aspects of the
case for supporting school choice directly with funding from individual
taxpayers rather than with government money.
Overview of Education Tax Credits
Education tax credits reduce the amount a taxpayer owes the government for each dollar spent on a child’s education or scholarships
for children who need them. For instance, if a business owes the state
$4,000 in taxes and donates $4,000 for scholarships, it will pay $0.00
in taxes and can choose the organization that receives the donation.
In some programs, the credit is less than 100 percent, but in all cases
the mechanism can be thought of as a waiver of a tax obligation—the
taxpayer gets to keep more of her own money to spend on education. This funding mechanism can, of course, be used to fund ESAs
instead of, or in addition to, scholarships. Tax credits for donations to
scholarship organizations can help support school choice for lowerincome families, and personal-use credits can help middle-class
families.
Donation tax credits have been the most popular credit policy. In
these programs, any charitable organization can file to become a Scholarship Granting Organization (SGO). SGOs receive tax credit donations
from businesses or individuals and then give scholarships to children to
attend private school. Here again, this funding mechanism can be used
to fill ESAs.
Financial Responsibility
In “Forging Consensus,” Coulson argued that “across the centuries
and around the world, direct financial responsibility for parents is associated with significantly better student outcomes and school conditions,
with keeping costs more firmly under control, and with the minimization of fraud.”4 In supporting these claims, Coulson marshaled modern
and historical examples, from ancient Greece to 19th-century Britain
and America, to modern India.
13
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Evidence abounds that parental financial responsibility is important,
and most people know intuitively that people tend to be much more
thoughtful and careful in spending their own money than that of others.
Ultimately, service providers are most concerned about pleasing those
who pay them. Parental choice isn’t the only consideration—how the
system is funded matters as well.
Nonrefundable, personal-use tax credits (in other words, money that
a family actually earned and owed in taxes) are the only mechanism
that gives parents full, direct financial responsibility. As Coulson noted
in “Forging Consensus,” parental financial responsibility “is the only
means by which parents have historically managed to retain control
over what, where, and by whom their children are taught. Without
financial responsibility, parental choice has sooner or later been lost.
Third-party payment in elementary and secondary education has consistently been associated with eventual third-party control over the
content and delivery of that education.”5
Donation tax credits involve third-party funding of educational
choice, but the people or entity that earned the money direct the donation of the funds. In other words, oversight, accountability, and diversity are built into the funding mechanism. A diversity of taxpayers and
SGOs act as a bulwark against market-killing centralization and control.
Legal Considerations
Courts do not consider tax credits to be government money, whereas
vouchers are considered government money.6 This distinction means
that vouchers face much greater legal peril than do tax credits. Six state
courts have ruled that because parents, not the government, spend the
government dollars, vouchers do not conflict with the state constitution.
Three other state courts—Vermont, Colorado, and Florida—have found
that voucher programs use government funds in ways that do violate
state constitutional restrictions and have therefore struck them down or
limited their use to secular private schools. The Arizona Supreme Court
struck down the state’s voucher program, but later upheld its publicly
funded ESA.
While the use of government funds does not automatically cause
vouchers to run afoul of state constitutional restrictions, it does open
myriad avenues of attack to which nonrefundable tax credits are not
vulnerable. As Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in a
ruling that upheld an education tax credit program, “a dissenter whose
14
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tax dollars are ‘extracted and spent’ knows that he has in some small
measure been made to contribute to an establishment in violation of
conscience. . . . [By contrast,] awarding some citizens a tax credit allows
other citizens to retain control over their own funds in accordance with
their own consciences.”7
State courts have repeatedly ruled that vouchers are government
funds.8 The disbursement of government funds to religious schools is
expressly prohibited in most states by turn-of-the-century anti-Catholic
“Blaine” amendments that were meant to keep public funding in
Protestant-influenced public schools and away from Catholic parochial
schools. Many states also have what are called “compelled support”
clauses, which get the same result through different language, precluding any citizen from being compelled to support religious institutions
or activities through their taxes. These religious provisions are the highest profile threats to voucher programs, but vouchers are vulnerable to
many other common state constitutional clauses regarding education.
Some defeats in court have been based on seemingly innocuous education clauses common in state constitutions. For example, in Florida,
the court struck down vouchers on the basis of a clause mandating a
“uniform” system of education. That ruling had nothing to do with religion, but it was possible because vouchers are considered government
funds.9
Furthermore, the degree to which a controversial policy is perceived
to be subject to legal jeopardy—regardless of legal precedent specific to
the issue—has been shown to dampen consideration by legislatures in
the first place.10 Politicians and other political actors consider the disposition of the courts and are much less likely to fight for and pass controversial legislation that has a high probability of being voided by the
courts. Survey data show that “state legislators admit they write laws in
anticipation of responses from the state supreme court,” and statistical
evidence derived from actual legislative activity supports the conclusion that policymakers respond to “perceived threats or opportunities
shaped by the ideological complexion of state supreme courts.”11 The
general legal difficulties that vouchers face, in other words, can significantly dampen political and legislative support for them.
The fact that the courts and the public regard vouchers as government funds and tax credits as private funds has a number of important
consequences. It means that tax credits are less likely to be challenged
in court, less likely to be overturned by a court, less likely to come with
15
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burdensome regulations, and less likely to accumulate regulations over
time. The most important implication is this: tax credits are a viable
option in many states where effective voucher programs are likely
to be struck down on state constitutional grounds. And even where
government funds are directed to ESAs, the source of the funding can
still cause legal and political troubles.12
Regulation
The fact that tax credits, unlike vouchers and government-funded
ESAs, are not government-funded is important in other ways, too.
School choice opponents have a more politically and legally compelling case for imposing burdensome regulations on voucher-redeeming
schools and the use of ESA funds than they do for schools and ESAs
that benefit only indirectly from tax credit programs.
In a government-funded system, the decision on whether or not to
continue funding students at any particular school is made by government actors through the political and legal process, not by individuals
through market interactions within civil society. Marginal, controversial
cases tend to drive public demand for more restrictive or prescriptive
rules; many people who pay the taxes that fund the school will demand
that their money not be used for a purpose they oppose. Over time,
such regulations, added in response to periodic difficulties, accumulate
until little freedom remains for education service providers.
Indeed, research supports the conclusion that government funds
tend to bring a higher regulatory burden to education, at least in regard
to vouchers.13 Even ESAs should not be considered immune from regulatory creep when funded directly by the government. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), commonly known as “food
stamps,” for instance, is essentially a “food savings account” funded
by the government. And the government has assembled an intricate
web of restrictions and a formula determining what can and cannot be
purchased with SNAP funds.
For example, beer and wine, despite having food value, cannot be
purchased with SNAP funds. Candy and cookies are allowed. The
government has decided that pumpkins are allowed, as they are edible; “however, inedible gourds and pumpkins that are used solely for
ornamental purposes are not eligible items.” Gift baskets are allowed,
but not “if the value of the non-food items exceeds 50 percent of the
purchase price.” That rule goes for “items such as birthday and other
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special occasion cakes”—they’re good to go “as long as the value of
non-edible decorations does not exceed 50 percent of the purchase
price of the cake.” It’s not clear how one determines the value of
non-edible items in a gift basket or on a birthday cake, but surely there
is a complicated formula somewhere on the Department of Agriculture
website.14 Beyond this complicated web of restrictions, there are always
calls for more—even drug testing of the recipients.15
The use of government funds always compels taxpayers to support
the actions taken by recipients, even if only in a very small way. It
implicates them in others’ behavior and choices, forcing individuals to
engage the political process to coerce an outcome. In contrast, tax credits
allow the free exchange of funds and services within civil society and
an education market without the need for coercion. Either the funds are
spent directly by the taxpayer who earned them or given freely by the
taxpayer who earned them to a person who needs them.
Political Dynamics
Funding school choice through tax credits has one massive additional advantage over direct government funding—political dynamics.
School choice policy advocates often underestimate this consideration.
Using tax credits to fund educational choice is generally more popular
with the public, easier to defend in public debate, easier to enact into
law, and easier to defend and expand after passage.
Education tax credits tend to be more popular than vouchers, and
vouchers are much more vulnerable to claims that government funds
are being diverted to some citizens to the detriment of others. A 2016
public opinion survey by the journal Education Next, for instance,
found that low-income-targeted tax credits garner 53 percent support
and just 29 percent opposition—a positive 24-point margin of support.
Low-income-targeted vouchers, in contrast, have a negative 11-point
margin of opposition (37 percent for and 48 percent against).16
The lower support for and greater opposition to vouchers seems
to be driven to a significant degree by the use of government money
to fund private school choice. The word “voucher” is not mentioned
in the survey; rather, the question refers to the government “helping
to pay the tuition” at a private school—a description that could just
as easily describe a government-funded ESA. The survey also used a
second version of the voucher question and found significant erosion in
the balance of support when it described vouchers as a policy that will
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“use government funds to pay the tuition.” With that language, support
fell to just 31 percent and opposition rose to 55 percent—a negative
24-point margin of opposition to using government money to fund private school choice.
Tax credits tend to be quite popular in general, much more so than
direct government spending. Americans are familiar with and well disposed toward tax credits, a common policy vehicle. The Hope Scholarship tax credit and child tax credits, for instance, are widely recognized
and popular tax breaks. Various kinds of college tax credits regularly
garner over 80 percent support.17
Some critics have lamented the proliferation of special interest tax
credits and deductions, but they proliferate for a reason. Tax credits are
a popular and relatively easy way to encourage spending on particular kinds of activities. Credits for education expenses have the same
advantages.
Tax credits are not just more popular and resistant to attack than
vouchers. Unlike programs funded with government money, tax credit–
funded choice programs actually build a network of institutions and
individuals with the resources and interest to defend and expand the
credits. Because individual taxpayers direct their money to the kind of
education they want to support, they become invested in their chosen
school or organization. A woman who takes advantage of a tax credit
benefits both directly and personally from the policy, even if she doesn’t
use the tax credit for her own child, because she can enjoy spending
her money on a child or educational mission she supports. In a similar
fashion, businesses that claim tax credits on donations benefit from and
have a stake in the law.
Perhaps most important, tax credits create a new and permanent
institutional support system for choice. The SGOs that arise to administer the donation tax credits form a new and powerful block of political
interests that do not exist under a voucher or government-funded ESA
program. SGOs have already proven effective advocates for the defense
and expansion of choice programs in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and
Pennsylvania. These organizations can quickly disseminate information to and mobilize parents, businesses, and schools, and they have the
funds and financial interests to do so.
In Pennsylvania, for instance, scholarship organizations funded
through the donation tax credit program have become a serious
political force. They act as an institutional base for supporters and
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beneficiaries, translating this constituency into a mobilized political
force. Andrew LeFevre, former executive director of the REACH Alliance, a Pennsylvania school choice organization, described the role of
his organization and that of the scholarship organizations in the state:
Upon passage of the [Educational Improvement Tax Credit]
EITC program in 2001, REACH made a strategic decision to
work on helping to set up a scholarship organization (SO) in
as many of the 67 counties as possible in order to begin the
process of connecting the people involved with the program—
most importantly the parents and children—with their elected
officials. As we enter the 2007–08 school year, there are now
approximately 180 SOs (as well as over 300 [educational improvement organizations] EIOs and 80 Pre-K SOs) that have
been created all across the Commonwealth. These groups serve
as a vital link between the families that they serve and the
legislators that have been responsible for more than doubling
the program cap over the past six years.
REACH works with the participating SOs to help them better
understand the importance of maintaining that personal relationship with their elected officials and the media to show the
tremendous positive impact that the program has on children
and families in their local districts. Many SOs now require
their families who receive scholarships to write to their elected
officials to thank them for their support of the program, generating thousands of letters a year to Harrisburg on behalf of the
EITC program.18

Tax credits, in other words, create interest groups with a direct stake
in defending and expanding the program. In turn, scholarship organizations use their resources to overcome collective action problems
and mobilize individuals who benefit from the program.19 Voucher and
government-funded ESA programs do not create these connective institutions and thereby leave program beneficiaries and supporters with a
more difficult organizational task.
Despite partisan polarization on the program when it was first
passed, in 2011 the Pennsylvania House voted to more than double the
size of the education tax credit program, with 96 percent in favor and
only 4 percent opposed. Indeed, in a year when a government-funded
school voucher policy failed, the funding for education tax credits in
Pennsylvania was increased by 100 percent. In 2010, a major expansion of Florida’s education tax credit program passed both houses
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overwhelmingly, with support from 42 percent of Democrats and
52 percent of the legislative black caucus.20 (Nearly every Republican
voted yes.) The program received just one Democratic vote when it was
created in 2001. New or expanded tax credit initiatives were signed by
Democratic governors in Arizona, Iowa, and Pennsylvania in 2006. That
same year, a Democrat-controlled legislature in Rhode Island passed a
donation tax credit. And the Democratic governor and legislature in
Iowa raised their tax credit dollar cap by 50 percent in 2007.
Everyone who participates in a tax credit program—individuals,
businesses, and scholarship organizations—has personally invested in
the program and has a strong, direct interest in defending and expanding it. Vouchers and government-funded ESAs simply do not create
that kind of communitywide, direct, and personal investment because
the government decides how and where to allocate collective funds.
Government-funded choice programs create a dispersed, uncoordinated constituency, composed primarily of low-income families. Tax
credit–funded programs create a coordinated network of organizations
and individuals with the resources and drive to force lawmakers to
attend to their concerns. In the medium and long term, these differences
in political dynamics are critical for achieving a broad, robust, dynamic
market in education.
Conclusion
Tax credit–funded school choice is superior to government-funded
choice in terms of encouraging and preserving parental financial
responsibility, avoiding and overcoming legal challenges, avoiding
market-killing regulations, and short- and long-term political dynamics.
Government-funded private school choice in other countries and in
the United States comes with and accretes many regulations. Regulations
are much less of a concern with tax credits, which both the courts and
the public view as private funds. For the same reason, education tax
credits are much better in principle than government-funded school
choice: tax credits allow the people who earned the money to disburse
it to the kind of education they deem appropriate. Government-funded
choice policies still compel taxpayers to support, say, a religious school
when they are atheist, or a secular school when they are religious—
even if only in some small way.
The difference between government-funded choice and education tax
credits is the difference between welfare and charity. It’s the difference
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between a government-funded, single-payer health insurance program
and a combination of donation-funded health savings accounts and
individual tax benefits for health spending. Tax credits preserve some
accountability to, and allow for discretion by, the people who actually
earned the money in the first place while still ensuring that all children
have access to a wide range of good educational options.
These issues are all related to one another. Government funding of
educational choice courts more legal problems and compels support of
education to which many taxpayers will object. Because of that compulsion, people will demand restrictions on the use of their tax dollars. And
because of those demands, the government will increasingly restrict
and regulate how the education money can be used. The absence of
freedom of choice for the taxpayer will naturally lead to a restriction of
choice for the students using the money and the schools accepting the
money. Education tax credits eliminate or greatly mitigate all of these
concerns and problems with government-funded choice.
In addition to mitigating problems with government-funded choice,
tax credit choice programs build a robust network of individuals and
institutions that can mobilize support and expand the program over
the long term. Government-funded choice policy cannot accomplish
that result.
If we are to develop a true market in education and transform educational opportunities for all children, we need to think strategically and
deeply about how each small step we take will promote or hinder the
expansion of educational freedom in the long run. Government schools
currently educate about 90 percent of all students, and the number of
private schools educating the rest is too small to constitute a real market.
The task ahead of us is to carve out and develop a market in education,
a task that will take decades even with the best policies enacted.
Although government and credit-derived funds will both accomplish
the same immediate goal of sending some children to an existing private school, only tax credit–funded programs provide a chance to transform the educational system in the long term.
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3. Tax Credits Can’t Create a Competitive
Education Marketplace
George A. Clowes

I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Andrew Coulson to
my development of a comprehensive menu of school choice options.
It was Coulson’s persistence in defending his views that prompted me
to find ways of addressing the issues he raised and defending them
against his challenges.
Andrew Coulson and I agreed on a central point: What is needed to
improve the present K–12 system of public schools is the creation of a
vigorous education marketplace, with different types of schools and
education providers actively competing for students and their tuition
dollars. Our differences lay in how to do it. His approach was to focus
school choice reform efforts almost exclusively on the use of personal
and scholarship tax credits, with the use of vouchers considered only as
a fallback position in situations in which tax credits would not work. My
position was, and still is, to focus reform efforts primarily on universal
vouchers while also supporting a range of other school choice options
because different parents and different education vendors need different school choice vehicles for a variety of valid reasons. We exchanged
views in 2004, when he published the report “Forging Consensus,”1
which argued for the superiority of tax credits. I responded with “Still
No Consensus on School Choice.”2 We again exchanged our different
views in 20083 at a conference on the design of school choice programs,
held at the Clemson Institute for the Study of Capitalism.4
“Education markets have consistently done a better job than state
monopolies of serving both our individual needs and our communal goals,” declared Coulson 15 years ago. “Yet all market-inspired
education reforms are not intrinsically or uniformly effective. They
can succeed only to the extent that they support the conditions for a
thriving education market and ensure that all families have access to
that market.”5
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Drawing from his own research,6 in which he examined modern and
historical precedents, Coulson concluded that the conditions necessary
for the effective operation of an education market are these:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Parental choice of school
Direct parental financial responsibility
Freedom for educators to establish different types of schools
Competition among educators
The profit motive for educators
Universal access

First, he argued, parental choice keeps schools focused on offering
what parents value and helps avoid social conflicts over the content of
instruction. Second, having parents pay some or all of the cost of their
child’s education is the only way, historically, that parental authority
and school autonomy have been maintained. Third, like other free market operators, educators must be free to specialize; to innovate; and
to set their own curricula, teaching methods, prices, and admissions
policies. Fourth, there must be vigorous competition among schools,
which would come from having a large number and variety of competing schools and large numbers of participating students. Fifth, for-profit
schools must be included because they have an incentive to expand in
response to excess demand for their services, unlike their nonprofit
counterparts. Finally, some form of third-party financial assistance is
required to ensure that low-income families have access to the education
marketplace.
Coulson compared voucher and tax credit programs with regard to
how well they met the necessary conditions for market education and
how well they allowed all families to participate in that market. He concluded that tax credits are the better alternative. Not only are they easier
to enact and defend, he argued, but also, “They are more effective at putting into place the freedoms and incentives necessary to the effective operation of the market, offer greater resistance to new regulation, decrease
the risk of fraud and corruption, and avoid problems that might arise
from state funding of religious schools.”7 He went on to recommend
that “the school choice movement’s single most important goal should
be the establishment of an optimal Universal Education Tax Credit program, and, if that proves impossible, an optimal voucher program.”8
Subsequently, he advocated strongly for tax credits over vouchers.
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My approach was to review the design features necessary for school
choice programs to create a competitive education marketplace and
thus be capable of reforming the public schools. I concluded that only
universal vouchers could achieve this objective. While all school choice
programs could rescue children from failing schools, only universal
vouchers could reform the system because only they had the potential
to achieve the levels of funding, participation, and direct competition
necessary for such a marketplace to develop. I also concluded that it
is better to provide parents with a variety of school choice options to
choose from, with different programs serving different purposes and
needs.9 To that end, I proposed a comprehensive range of choices for
parents and, equally important, a range of mechanisms to enable public, private secular, and religious schools to respond to competition.
These choices involved a variety of public and private school options,
including open enrollment, charter schools, vouchers, individual tax
credits, and tax credit scholarships.
Because both proposals—Coulson’s tax credit proposal and my fullmenu school choice proposal—are intended to produce a competitive
K–12 education marketplace, let us examine what conditions are
necessary for the emergence of such a “thriving education market,” as
Coulson termed it.
Creation of a Thriving Education Market
A free and universally accessible market in K–12 education exists
when a parent, as the consumer, has access to the funds necessary to
buy a satisfactory package of educational services for his or her child
from the offerings of a variety of schools and instructional service
companies. The competing vendors would offer a range of goods and
services of different prices, qualities, capabilities, and technological
novelty. Vendors would compete for each parent’s funds, and the ones
best at securing them would have a strong incentive to expand. In such
a market, no vendor would receive a preferential government subsidy
or be subject to onerous regulation, and it would be relatively easy for
new vendors to enter the market. Low barriers to entry encourage vendors to operate efficiently and keep parents happy or else risk loss of
business to new startups.
The American public schools system is far from this ideal. Most
decisions regarding the allocation of taxpayer funds to schools are
made by state and local government officials rather than by parents.
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In addition, the schools are government-owned, government-run,
government-staffed, and government-monitored.
In 1955, Milton Friedman suggested a different approach. Although
government financing of K–12 education was appropriate, he argued
that government-run schools were not justifiable in a predominantly
free enterprise society because the freedom of the individual, or the
family, is the objective of such a society, not “an indiscriminate extension of governmental responsibility.”10 To elevate parental freedom
within the existing school finance system, he proposed that a subsidy, in
the form of a school voucher, be made available to all parents regardless
of which school they attended. He predicted that this system would result in the emergence of “a wide variety of schools” that would compete
and produce greater effectiveness and efficiency over time.
Friedman’s proposal attracted little public attention until, some three
decades later, concerns about the quality of public schools had become widespread. By 1989, Albert Shanker, president of the American
Federation of Teachers, was warning his members that if public schools
did not improve soon, then “policymakers are going to find a cure
that will be radical and painful,” such as using public funds in private
schools.11
“We need system-wide change,” wrote Shanker, because the system
is the problem. “It’s time to admit,” he wrote, “that public education
operates like a planned economy, a bureaucratic system in which everybody’s role is spelled out in advance and there are few incentives
for innovation and productivity. It’s no surprise that our school system
doesn’t improve; it more resembles the communist economy than our
own market economy.”12
Shanker’s warning came too late. The “radical and painful” cure he
warned about—using public funds in private schools—was already being enacted in Wisconsin, with the creation of a voucher program that
targeted children from low-income families in Milwaukee and featured
vouchers that could be used as full tuition at a participating secular
private school.
Vouchers are a powerful school reform tool because they shift the
funding from being institution centered to being child centered. With
vouchers, charter schools, and open district school enrollment policies, public education funding follows the child to the school chosen
by his or her parents; vouchers empower parents over school boards
and school principals because if the parents are not satisfied with the
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education the schools provide for their child, they will take their child—
and the child’s education dollars—somewhere else.
Tax credits are another tool to enhance school choice, but they take a
significantly different approach from vouchers. Rather than reallocating the government’s education funding, tax credits instead encourage
private citizens and corporations to donate to nonprofit scholarship organizations that help families pay private school tuition, or reduce the
taxes paid by parents and legal guardians who pay for tuition and other
educational expenses.
The key feature of tax credits is that they would prompt new spending on K–12 education outside of and in addition to the current system.
Vouchers, on the other hand, would redirect current education dollars
to schools chosen by parents.
What Does a Competitive Market in K–12 Education Look Like?
Would we recognize a competitive market in K–12 education if we saw
one? As initial criteria for such an assessment, we have Coulson’s six requirements that I detailed above. To these, we can add requirements that
other school choice advocates have identified as important, and we can
specify conditions that have proven critical to the competitiveness—or
lack thereof—of various voucher programs.
For example, most school choice advocates expect a competitive education market to produce quality improvements and cost savings from
innovation and experimentation. However, Friedman pointed out that
this outcome requires the inclusion of higher-income families in school
choice programs because they are the early adopters of new developments
and innovations.13 Economist John Merrifield has also identified the stability of the program as a key element of an education market, because
producers need to have confidence in the reliability of a projected revenue
stream.14
In a 2008 study of why voucher programs had not produced the vibrant
education market that reformers had expected, I concluded that voucher
programs had to include three design features to produce the level of
competition necessary to spur improvements in the public schools.15
First, the voucher value must be substantial. A voucher value capped
at half of the district schools’ annual per-pupil allocation or less reduces
competition by limiting the number and kinds of private schools that
are willing to participate. This, in turn, limits the number of students
who can participate.
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Second, the money must truly follow the child. Schools will respond
to competitive pressure only if there are financial consequences when
students leave. Private schools must actively compete for students.
However, when voucher programs or state education policies include “hold harmless” provisions or otherwise insulate districts from
the financial consequences of decreasing enrollment, schools in those
districts have little incentive to respond competitively.16 For vouchers
to work, the rule of “the money follows the child” must be applied to
rejected schools as well as to chosen schools.
Third, voucher competition must be explicit. The response of district schools to competition from vouchers depends on the proximity
and size of the competitive threat. When faced by a well-publicized,17
imminent, and specific threat from vouchers, district schools respond
strongly to the competitive challenge. However, when faced with a
small and diffuse competitive challenge from vouchers, district schools
respond only weakly.
Combining these added requirements with Coulson’s, our final list
of requirements for a competitive education market is as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

Parental choice of school
Direct parental financial responsibility
Freedom for educators to establish different types of schools
Explicit competition among educators
The profit motive for educators (and the need for a reliable
revenue stream)
• Universal access (including low- and high-income families)
• Per-pupil funding comparable to the public schools, with the funding following the child
An indication of what are the critical elements among those requirements comes from a surprising place: charter schools. This is surprising
because such schools have not been highly regarded by many free market advocates, including myself; they have been viewed as compromised tools for reform because they are subject to significantly more
state regulation than private schools that accept vouchers. Market entry
is severely restricted; charter schools may not have a religious affiliation; parents cannot be required to contribute financially to tuition; and
limitations are placed on parental choice, educator freedom, and enrollment boundaries. In addition, per-pupil funding is only 72 percent of
that in a traditional district school, on average.18
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However, as Lisa Snell pointed out more than a decade ago, “charter
schools have met more of the criteria of a free market in education than
most current tax credit and school voucher programs.”19 First, she noted,
charter schools have added substantial new school capacity since the first
one opened in 1991; by February 2016, more than 6,800 charter schools
were serving nearly 3 million children nationwide at a cost of almost
$21 billion a year, according to data from the Center for Education Reform.20
Second, said Snell, numerous for-profit providers—for example, White Hat
Management and National Heritage Academies—have developed successful school models, branded them, and set about replicating them.
Although charter schools are public schools, for-profit companies may
be involved in operating them. Two-thirds of charter schools are independently run, nonprofit, single-site schools; another 20 percent are run
by nonprofit organizations with multiple sites; and 13 percent are run by
for-profit companies with multiple sites.21 According to a 2011–12 study,
the largest of the for-profit companies were Imagine Schools (operating
89 schools), Academica (76), National Heritage Academies (68), K12 Inc.
(57), and Edison Learning (53).22 The largest charter school operator is
KIPP (Knowledge Is Power Program), a nonprofit that established a
successful model and now has 200 schools in 20 states serving nearly
80,000 students.23 Although charter school approaches and specializations
vary widely—such as performing arts, foreign language immersion, and
project-based learning—the top six focuses are college prep (30 percent);
core knowledge (16 percent); science, technology, engineering, and math
(STEM) (8 percent); blended learning (6 percent); and constructivist and
back-to-basics (both at 5 percent).24 The creation of all these new schools
recalls Friedman’s prediction that vouchers—in this case, public school
vouchers—would result in the emergence of “a wide variety of schools.”
What accounts for the success of charter schools in not only promoting competition between schools but also in persuading entrepreneurs
to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in the creation of almost 7,000
new schools since 1991? I have already detailed the limitations placed
on charter schools that deter competition, but what are the features
that appear to have been critical to their success in enhancing competition? First, they offer universal access—all students are eligible. Second,
competition is explicit because charter school enrollment gains and
district school student losses are usually well covered by the news media. Third, the money follows the child and traditional district schools
generally face financial consequences when they lose students. Fourth,
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per-student funding, while not generous, is adequate, and it comes
from a reliable and predictable source.
We now have a set of requirements for the creation of a competitive
education market, plus a good indication of the factors that are critical
to the success of that process. Let us now examine tax credits in light of
those findings.
The Education Marketplace with Tax Credits
If tax credits are going to create an education marketplace, the place
to look for any signs of that would be in Florida, where the state’s
15-year-old tax credit scholarship program provides one of the highest
per-pupil scholarship values relative to district school spending.
According to EdChoice (formerly the Friedman Foundation),25 the
Florida tax credit scholarship program was expected to provide scholarships of about $5,680 to more than 92,000 participants in 2016–17,
or 3.3 percent of the state’s 2,778,914 K–12 district school students in
2015–16.26 The average scholarship is 85 percent of the state’s average
$6,681 elementary private school tuition and 64 percent of the state’s
average $8,926 private high school tuition.27 The average scholarship
value in 2014–15 was about $5,000,28 which was 49 percent of the total expenditures per pupil of $10,156 for the state’s district schools.29
The program was close to its cap of $559.1 million, or 2 percent of the
$27.9 billion in total state, local, and federal expenditures for K–12 education for 2014–15.30 The cap increases by 25 percent each year when the
credits claimed reach 90 percent of the cap, and with increased funding,
the per-student funding cap on scholarships can also grow.
Although one of Coulson’s objectives in using scholarship tax credits
is to create a vigorous education marketplace with strong participation
by for-profit operators, a breakdown of schools taking in the Florida
scholarship tax credit shows that objective is far from being achieved.
As of February 2016, of the 1,594 participating schools, 69 percent were
religious and 31 percent were secular; of the 79,719 participating students, 82 percent attended religious schools and 18 percent attended
secular schools.31 In addition, the current list of schools does not indicate
the participation of any secular multisite operators. With only a modest scholarship value, Florida’s tax credit scholarship program—while
extremely successful in many respects—has not attracted for-profit (or
even nonprofit) entrepreneurs who might want to serve scholarship
students the same way that charter school students are served.
30

104856_Ch03.indd 30

3/31/17 8:46 PM

Tax Credits Can’t Create a Competitive Education Marketplace
Religious schools also predominate as recipients of tuition funds generated by Arizona’s scholarship tax credit program, which is the nation’s oldest, having started in 1997.32 In 2014–15, the program served
30,049 children,33 or just 2.7 percent of the state’s 1,117,905 K–12 district and charter school students.34 The average scholarship value was
$1,846, or 21 percent of the state’s 2014–15 total expenditures of $8,854
per pupil in district and charter schools.35 A newer corporate tax credit
scholarship for low-income children served 16,573 children in 2014–15
with a similar scholarship value of $1,892.36 With such low scholarship
values, it is highly unlikely that either of these programs would attract
the interest of educational entrepreneurs.
Although tax credit scholarships may not spur the creation of new
schools, their predominant use in religious schools not only supports
the desire of many parents to provide a religious education to their
children, it also illustrates the need for such scholarships in states
with a large charter school presence. That’s because charter schools
draw students not only from public schools but also from private
schools, and particularly from religious schools. A recent study37
showed that in both New York and Michigan, roughly one out of every three charter-school students came from a Catholic school, a result
supported by a Cato Institute study.38 Tax credit scholarships play a
vitally important role in providing the funds necessary for religious
and other private schools to respond effectively to this competition
from charter schools.
No Competition for Money
One explanation for why tax credits have not spurred the creation
of a competitive marketplace is that the private schools involved do
not compete directly for money with the district schools. Although
the money from tax credits follows the child to the chosen school, that
money is not derived from current K–12 education dollars but from a
new source of funding. And while it is true that a continuing migration
of district school students to private schools would ultimately result in a
reduction of total funding for the district school, the district school may
not be fully aware that it is losing students because of a school choice
program. And that would tend to mute any competitive response by
district schools. This intrinsic feature of tax credits—not competing directly for money with the public schools—limits the likelihood that tax
credits would produce a vigorous education marketplace.
31

104856_Ch03.indd 31

3/31/17 8:46 PM

Educational Freedom
In the 2014–15 school year, total expenditures for U.S. K–12 district
schools were $662 billion, or just over $13,300 per enrolled pupil, with
49.7 million students.39 Using the charter school experience, we can expect that a taxpayer-funded voucher worth $10,000, or about 75 percent
of district school spending, would be adequate to educate a student
and to attract the interest of for-profit education vendors. However, to
provide comparable-value scholarships funded by tax credits would
require a very substantial increase in charitable donations. For example,
providing a scholarship of $10,000 for just one in five district school
students would require tax credit donations of almost $100 billion a year.
Total charitable donations to education in 2015 were only $56 billion.
To satisfy the funding requirements of tax credit scholarships with
three-quarter price scholarships would require a huge increase in giving to education. If we use district school enrollment to scale up the
$559.1 million Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program to the national
level, the program would be raising an estimated $10 billion a year for
education, enough to provide scholarships worth $5,000 to only about
2 million of the nation’s roughly 56 million school-aged children. While
that is a significant achievement, it is not sufficient to create the kind of
education market that Coulson envisioned.
Preserving Direct Parental Responsibility
Coulson also argued that tax credits were superior to vouchers because “tax credits do a better job of preserving direct parental financial
responsibility.”40 That is certainly true for personal tax credits. But the
problem with them is that the amount of the credit is too small to be of
much benefit to most taxpayers because their income tax liability is small
compared with the cost of an education at a private school. Thus, most
parents would need to rely on an ample supply of tax credit–funded
scholarships to send their children to private schools. That would still
be the case even if credits could be applied to school property taxes, as
an analysis below will show.
To ensure more active parental interest and direct parental responsibility with tax credit–funded scholarship awards, Coulson argued it
would be beneficial for tax credit–funded scholarships to have a copayment. In fact, this is already the case with almost all current programs
because the scholarship amount usually does not cover the full cost of
private school tuition and must be “topped up” by parents. However,
copayments or topping-up capabilities are also viewed as desirable
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design features of voucher programs. Current voucher programs that
permit parents to top up voucher payments include Indiana’s Choice
Scholarship Program and Florida’s McKay Scholarship Program for
students with special needs, among others.41
Thus, for tax credit–funded scholarships as they are structured at
present, parents almost always do have to use their own money to pay
for the education of their child, which would meet Coulson’s objective
of preserving direct parental financial responsibility. However, because
voucher programs also could—and frequently do—allow parents to
supplement or top up voucher payments to meet the actual cost of private school tuition, his argument in favor of tax credits turns out not to
be as strong as it appears initially. Indeed, given a choice between the
two, it is not at all clear why parents should prefer a scholarship funded
by tax credits over a voucher funded by taxpayers. Both are funded
by “other people’s money,” both might need to be supplemented with
money from parents, and both achieve the objective of paying for a
child to attend a private school.
Even without a required copayment, vouchers and scholarships can
still be structured to encourage parents to treat the other people’s money involved as if it were their own. As Friedman famously pointed out,
when people spend their own money on themselves, they seek the best
value at the least cost, but when people spend other people’s money
on themselves, they seek the best value with little concern for the cost.
However, under a 2002 voucher plan proposed by the Heartland Institute,42 parents are incentivized to get the best cost–benefit from their
voucher funds by allowing them to keep any voucher funds left over
after paying tuition, place the money into an education savings account
(ESA), and then spend the surplus funds on college tuition or supplementary tutoring services.43 Although Coulson hailed the proposal as
innovative, he concluded it was unlikely to achieve its stated goals because it still involved other people’s money.44 However, when a 2011
Arizona voucher program was built around the ESA feature with more
flexible usage options, Heartland’s view of the ESA’s cost-control potential began to prevail.
“[T]wo features of ESAs—the ability of parents to completely customize their child’s education and save for future educational expenses—
make them distinct from and improvements upon traditional school
vouchers,” wrote Jason Bedrick and Lindsey Burke in 2015. “ESAs
empower parents with the ability to maximize the value their children
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get from their education services. And because they control how and when
the money is spent, parents also have a greater incentive to control costs.”45
(emphasis added)
Giving parents the authority to decide when and where to spend
other people’s money does create a strong incentive for them to use
the money cost-effectively. Although it’s not the kind of direct parental financial responsibility that Coulson envisaged, it achieves the same
objective.
Tax Credits Do Not Use Public Money
Coulson posited that the second most significant advantage of tax
credit programs over vouchers is that they avoid the use of public
money.46 In Kotterman v. Killian (1999), the Arizona Supreme Court ruled
that the state’s education tax credits do not involve government spending but simply let taxpayers keep more of their own money. Therefore,
donating the amount of the credit to a religious or secular scholarshipgranting organization does not involve the use of public money. The
state court decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
refused to hear the appeal and thus let the lower court ruling stand.
Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn (2011), and several other state supreme courts have also held that tax credits—like
tax deductions or tax exemptions—are not public money. To date,
tax credit scholarships have a 100 percent record of being upheld as
constitutional.
According to Coulson, the fact that tax credits do not use public
money gives them two distinct advantages over vouchers with regard
to (1) church–state entanglement and (2) regulation. Because all of the
money involved in tax credit programs is the taxpayer’s own and not
the state’s, there is no church–state entanglement issue and no necessity
for public oversight and state regulation of the spending. I will discuss
these two issues in turn.

The Issue of Church–State Entanglement
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the Cleveland voucher program, which includes religious
schools, does not violate the U.S. Constitution because it is not the
state but parents who choose to spend voucher funds at religious or
secular schools. However, Coulson points out that the constitutional
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issues regarding vouchers are less clear at the state level, where
19 states have prohibitions on the “compelled support” of religious
activities that are contrary to the dictates of conscience. In addition,
36 states have a so-called Blaine Amendment in their constitution
that forbids state funding of religious institutions or practices. These
amendments were adopted as part of a bigoted 19th-century campaign to bar Catholic schools from receiving the same kind of government funding that was provided to the pervasively Protestant
“common” schools of the time.
Coulson argued that because all but three states have a compelled
support clause or a Blaine Amendment in their constitution, vouchers
are much more likely than tax credits to run afoul of these state constitutional provisions. Future voucher litigation, he predicted, “will inevitably pit Free Exercise against Free Exercise. The question will be:
does the free exercise right of parents (who want to use vouchers for
religious schooling) trump the free exercise right of taxpayers (who object on moral or religious grounds to paying for that schooling). Because
the U.S. Constitution does not provide clear guidance on how to resolve
this conflict, the Supreme Court may well defer to state constitutional
provisions that forbid compelled support of religion or state funding of
devotional instruction.”47
However, Coulson’s remedy of abandoning vouchers in favor of tax
credits is not an appropriate solution for two reasons. First, it gives
credence to a false representation of vouchers—voiced most commonly
by opponents—that modern voucher programs violate freedom of conscience by “compelling” taxpayers to provide direct aid to religious
institutions and thus support religion with tax dollars. In fact, modern
voucher programs involve aid to families, with the funds paid directly
to parents who then freely choose to spend those funds at the religious
or secular school of their choice. Even Robert Chanin, chief counsel for
the National Education Association, admitted before the U.S. Supreme
Court in 2002 that such a transfer of funds “was constitutional” because the intervention of parents breaks the circuit between school and
state.48
Second, the remedy treats Blaine amendments as if they were acceptable tools for opponents to deploy in their attempts to strike down
voucher programs. They are not. Efforts should continue to educate the
public about the bigoted history of these anti-Catholic constitutional
provisions and the need for their repeal. In the ruling on Mitchell v.
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Helms (2000), U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas made clear
that the high court viewed Blaine amendments as ripe for repeal:
[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful
pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow. . . . [N]othing in
the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of pervasively
sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs,
and other doctrines of this Court bar it. This doctrine, born of
bigotry, should be buried now.49

In a 2009 Institute for Justice analysis of state constitution religion
clauses, Richard D. Komer concluded that compelled support clauses
should not present a barrier to school choice programs because only
Vermont had used its clause to bar religious schools from a voucher program.50 The situation with Blaine amendments is mixed because some
states have used the amendment to bar items such as transportation
and textbook benefits for students at religious schools. Komer suggests
it “would be wise” to consider tax credit programs rather than vouchers in such states and to pursue vouchers and tax credits in the other
states. This suggestion strikes me as a better strategy than abandoning
vouchers, although my own preference would be to pursue vouchers
in all Blaine Amendment states, with ultimate resolution by the U.S.
Supreme Court.

The Issue of Regulation
Some advocates fear that school choice programs will bring a heavy
regulatory burden to private schools that could stifle the emergence
of market forces. There is no constitutional barrier to such regulation.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that, although the “child is not the mere creature of the state,”
the state nevertheless has the power to regulate all schools, public
or private, and that the government can establish rules and regulations for private schools even if the schools do not make use of public
money.
Coulson argued that vouchers bring a greater risk of regulatory encroachment because they involve the use of public money. Tax credits
do not use public funds and thus are much less likely than vouchers to
bring additional government regulation to private schools. Many tax
credit advocates do not support refundable tax credits because they involve government money, just like vouchers.
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“Because of the greater resistance to regulation that follows from the
absence of state funding under tax-credit programs, those programs do
a better job of protecting all the criteria for effective markets from regulatory encroachment,” declared Coulson.51 The findings from several
studies provide strong support for his view. After conducting a statistical analysis of 20 voucher and tax credit programs, Coulson concluded
in a 2010 Cato Institute report that, while vouchers “impose a substantial and statistically significant additional regulatory burden on participating private schools,” tax credits do not.52 A 2014 study by Andrew D.
Catt for the Friedman Foundation analyzed 23 school choice programs
and found that the regulatory impact scores of private school vouchers were more than three times more negative than the scores of tax
credit scholarship programs. In particular, Catt found that voucher programs have more regulations related to paperwork and reporting than
tax credit scholarship programs do.53 A 2013 study by David A. Stuit
and Sy Doan for the Thomas B. Fordham Institute examined 13 school
choice programs and also found that tax credit scholarship programs
are “significantly less subject to additional regulations than voucher
programs.”54 In 2015, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) published
an extensive survey of 954 private school leaders in three states with
school choice programs. The survey found that existing and possible future regulations were top concerns among leaders of schools participating in the choice programs (and even more so for those who chose not
to participate). Moreover, these concerns were higher in Indiana and
Louisiana (which have voucher programs) than in Florida (which has
a tax credit program). Also, although nearly 100 percent of schools participating in the voucher programs cited concerns with the paperwork
and reporting burden involved, only about half of Florida participants
cited this as a concern with the tax credit program.55
In the Fordham Institute study, the researchers conducted a survey
of 241 participating and nonparticipating private schools in five cities
with voucher programs to determine which kinds of regulation cause
the most difficulty for private schools. They found that more than half
of private school leaders said it was very/extremely important to be
able to uphold admissions criteria, but only a quarter regarded having
to take state tests or teach state curricula as very/extremely important.56
More than 40 percent of respondents regarded these additional regulations as very/extremely important: allowing students to opt out of religious activities, the amount of paperwork required, and the maximum
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dollar amount of the voucher. Overall, the study showed that the more
regulations a program had, the less likely schools were to participate.
Even so, only 3 percent of nonparticipating schools cited their unwillingness to comply with program rules as the single most important reason for not participating. The most cited reason for not participating
was low demand resulting from the lack of voucher-eligible families in
the area.
The AEI study came to somewhat different conclusions regarding
regulations and testing, possibly because the Fordham Institute survey
focused on urban areas while the AEI study was statewide. The AEI
researchers found that, far from being unconcerned about rules, nonparticipants cited their top-ranked concerns as possible future regulations and their effect on a school’s independence and character. Also
considered highly problematic by participants and nonparticipants
alike were related concerns such as school autonomy, state curricular
requirements, and requirements to take state tests rather than nationally normed tests.
The survey responses led the authors of the AEI study to offer a number of policy recommendations, which included increasing the voucher/
scholarship amount and removing certain eligibility restrictions. These
two recommendations mesh with the top two responses that the Fordham Institute study obtained from nonparticipating schools asked what
regulatory changes would influence them to participate: expanding eligibility to all families and raising the maximum voucher amount. While
a low-value voucher may be acceptable as reduced price tuition to fill
empty seats in existing schools, the Fordham Institute researchers point
out that it is unlikely to provide an incentive to add new seats or for
new schools to open. “The current funding levels of most programs are
insufficient to attract new school operators,” Stuit and Doan noted, “in
part because there is such strong competing demand for new schools
in the charter school sector, where per-pupil funding is closer to that of
traditional public schools.”57
From these studies, we can conclude that Coulson was right: voucher
programs do attract significantly more regulatory encroachment than
tax credits do. However, different kinds of regulation represent different levels of encroachment. For example, a testing requirement is much
more onerous when it mandates taking state tests rather than choosing
among numerous nationally normed tests. The two regulatory changes
that would do most to increase participation, and hence competition,
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are these: make access universal and increase the value of the voucher.
These are key features of charter schools, which currently are sucking
all of the oxygen out of the school choice marketplace.
There will always be pressure for more regulation than is necessary.
As Thomas Jefferson observed, “The natural progress of things is for
liberty to yield, and government to gain ground.” One way to help
guard against such encroachment would be legislation to preserve the
autonomy of private schools and protect them against the imposition of
any undue burden from additional regulation.
Reliability and Sufficiency of Funding Stream
Can tax credits provide the reliability and sufficiency of funding that
is required to bring entrepreneurs into the K–12 education market?
A 2001 Heartland Institute study of two proposed income tax credits for
New Jersey estimated that the combined effect of the two credits—one
to mitigate tuition costs and the other to encourage donations to scholarship organizations—would be to prompt 7 percent of public school
students to transfer to private schools, increasing private school enrollment by about 40 percent.58 However, the study also revealed a serious
limitation of tax credits that are applied to state income taxes: the relatively small number of children that benefit. The tuition tax credit benefits only a small number of children because most families pay much
less in state income tax than the cost of tuition at private schools. Even
when the rules governing use of the tuition tax credits were relaxed,
this produced only a few additional transfers of students out of the public schools.59
In addition, the study estimated the proposed scholarship tax credit
was unlikely to raise sufficient funds to pay the full cost of tuition for all
children who want to attend a private school. Although the scholarship
tax credit could raise as much as a half billion dollars a year for scholarships in New Jersey, that amount was just 3.2 percent of the $15.6 billion
a year spent on K–12 education by New Jersey state and local governments at the time the study was conducted.60
The actual experience of Florida’s corporate tax credit program
shows that the New Jersey estimates could be somewhat low. As previously noted, the Florida program provides scholarships averaging
$5,680 to over 92,000 participants, or 3.3 percent of the state’s K–12 district and charter school students. The program currently is capped at
$559.1 million, or 2 percent of the state’s total expenditures on K–12
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education. The cap may be stepped up in 25 percent increments to a
theoretical maximum of about $3 billion in state corporate income and
insurance premium tax receipts. However, for a variety of reasons such
as economic fluctuations and diminishing returns with smaller donors,
a practical maximum of about $2 billion appears more likely, or about
7.5 percent of Florida’s total spending on K–12 education. With a future scholarship amount estimated at $6,000 per student, a $2 billion
fund could serve about 333,000 students, which is slightly less than
the 360,000 students currently attending private schools in Florida and
about 12 percent of the students attending public schools in 2015–16.
This amount would provide the program with considerable room for
growth in the near term but with a need for additional funding sources
within a decade or so. To summarize, the Florida program currently
is about half the size projected for the New Jersey program and could
potentially grow to almost twice the size.
The Florida program has a small effect on competition, according
to a 2011 study of the program by Northwestern University researchers David Figlio and Cassandra Hart. They found that the competitive effect of the scholarships produces a modest improvement in test
scores for both scholarship students and public school students.61
However, the situation in Florida could not be called a thriving education market for a number of reasons. First, as noted, the continuing
predominance of religious schools in the mix of participating schools
indicates that for-profit schools have little interest in this market. Second, while the scholarship value may be sufficient to fill empty seats,
it may not be enough to incentivize the addition of new seats. Third,
the scholarship value is unlikely to be increased significantly because
the desire to help as many children as possible tends to lower the average scholarship value. Fourth, investors may have some concerns
about putting capital at risk and relying on charitable donations for
revenues.
Despite these limitations, tax credit scholarships are still an important
school choice option. They have significant value in that they enable religious and secular private schools to respond to the competitive pressures imposed on them by charter schools—alternatives to traditional
public schools that are attractive to private school parents because they
offer free tuition and universal access. Pushing for tax credit scholarships should be a high priority for school choice advocates, including
proponents of vouchers and charter schools.
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To provide access to much larger tax liabilities, Coulson and his colleague Adam Schaeffer proposed applying the credit to property taxes
as well as income taxes.62 Yet even when property taxes are included,
the tuition tax credit often falls short as a way for individual taxpayers
to cover the cost of tuition at a private school. For example, after adding
property taxes to the proposed New Jersey tuition tax credit discussed
earlier, Coulson concluded that “even a combined property and income
tax credit would leave many families with insufficient resources to cover
all their private school expenses.”63 That finding is significant because if
individual tax credits do not generate sufficient funds in New Jersey—
where property taxes make up an unusually large proportion (almost
two-thirds) of K–12 education resources—they certainly cannot generate sufficient funds in other states, where property taxes play a smaller
role in education funding.
Thus, a school choice plan involving nonrefundable tax credits would
need a scholarship component to provide funds not only for low-income
families to exercise school choice but also for higher-income families
whose combined state and property tax liability would still be insufficient to cover the cost of tuition at a private school. Schaeffer argued that
his plan, with no cap on total contributions from property taxes, would
generate substantial scholarship funds. Taxpayers could zero out the
property tax payments they make to their local schools and redirect those
funds to private schools and to private school scholarship organizations.
The operation of the plan was illustrated by describing an upperincome family, the Garcias, who donate 100 percent of the family’s
combined income tax, sales tax, and property tax liability for the year
—$22,000—to three private school scholarship organizations. These organizations then fund scholarships worth up to 80 percent of current
per-pupil spending in the public schools. To keep costs down and to encourage direct financial responsibility, the plan phases out benefits with
increasing family income. Thus, while high-income families would be
free to donate all of their substantial tax liability to scholarship organizations to benefit other children, they would not be able to use the
tuition tax credit to benefit their own children nor receive any scholarships. With their $200,000 income, the Garcias would still have to pay
the full tuition cost for the private school education they had chosen for
their daughter Isabel.
Part of Milton Friedman’s argument for universal vouchers was
that high-income families need to be included in school choice
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programs—as beneficiaries as well as donors—in order to provide
the necessary funding for innovation and experimentation. By reducing benefits for middle-income families and barring benefits for
high-income families like the Garcias, Schaeffer’s tax credit plan falls
short of establishing the conditions necessary to create a competitive
market. Access would not be universal and only low-income families would receive the high-value scholarships that would attract forprofit school operators.
It appears, then, that even if expanded to include property taxes,
tax credits are unlikely to be as widely available or well funded as
would be necessary to create a competitive marketplace. Nevertheless,
Schaeffer’s proposal for using property taxes to fund school choice programs is worth pursuing for vouchers as well as for tax credits. Creating
a personal property tax credit for education is readily justified on fairness grounds. Parents who are paying to place their children in a local
private school—thereby enriching the diversity of their community—
should not be forced to also pay property taxes for their local public
schools. Handling such a credit as an exemption, like homeowner and
senior citizen exemptions, would be a relatively easy way for local government units to handle such a credit.
The Way Forward
Three requirements appear critical for the creation of a competitive
market in K–12 education: universal access, a well-funded voucher
or scholarship, and assurance that the money follows the child. Any
school choice program that lacks these three components may rescue
children from failing schools or help parents keep their child at a private school, but it will not create any significant competition in the
education marketplace. To date, only charter schools have come close
to having all three components, with both vouchers and tax credits severely limited by low voucher/scholarship amounts and restrictions on
student eligibility.
Also, clearly, no one school choice program satisfies all the criteria
that various reformers consider important for the issues they champion,
nor is there one school choice program that is capable of satisfying the
different priorities of parents and the range of concerns of taxpayers.
After arguing back and forth with Coulson regarding the relative merits of different school choice programs, I examined what features are
necessary for school choice programs to create the kind of competitive
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education marketplace that would reform the public schools. I came to
the following conclusion:
Just as one size does not fit all in public schooling, one size does
not fit all in school choice. Parents need a variety of options to
choose from, and it is not necessary to address the needs of all
parents and children with a single school choice program. If
different programs were designed to serve different purposes,
parents would have a menu of educational options to choose
from for their children.64

I developed a comprehensive proposal “to provide just such a menu
that offers parents a full range of educational choices.”65 Only two of the
options—charter schools and vouchers—have the funding adequacy
and reliability to accommodate the inclusion of for-profit operators interested in expanding a model school beyond a successful single-site
operation. But a wide variety of different single-site schools would
provide competition among education providers and a wide range of
choices for parents.
The proposed options, which have been refined since their original
presentation, provide a range of choices to parents and, equally important, a range of mechanisms to enable public, private secular, and religious schools to respond to competition:
• Public school choice—interdistrict open enrollment and charter
schools to provide the public school equivalent of vouchers
• Private school choice—lightly regulated school vouchers worth at
least 75 percent of total per-pupil district school spending (with the
ability to “top up” tuition) that parents could use at secular and
religious private schools, including new all-voucher schools
• Education savings account66—for all children, worth at least 75 percent
of per-pupil district school spending, redeemable for any approved
educational services or products
• Special education voucher—based on Florida’s McKay Scholarship voucher, which is fully funded and redeemable at secular and
religious schools
• Individual income tax credit for educational expenses—to support
parents’ efforts to send their children to private schools
• Individual property tax credit for owners and renters67—for tuition
at private schools or donations to a private school or to a child’s
tuition expenses
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• Scholarship income tax credit for individuals and corporations—
for donations to organizations directing scholarships to private
schools
If we can agree that it is better for parents to have several different
school choice options available for educating their child, we can also
perhaps break down the artificial barriers that have emerged between
advocates of the different school choice approaches. What is needed is
for these “islands of school choice” to begin to communicate more with
each other with the aim of supporting each other’s proposals instead of
remaining on the sidelines as observers or stepping forward as public
critics. For example, when charter school advocates propose expansion
legislation and want support from other school choice proponents, they
would be more likely to get it if they would also advocate and support
parallel legislation for tax credits so that private schools and particularly religious schools could better compete with them in an expansion
environment. Voucher proposals in particular could use more support
because they attract, and must deflect, much opposition criticism that
is often applicable to other parts of the school choice movement, too.
Such mutual support would be very helpful, and it would not only
help vouchers. As Jay P. Greene, professor at the University of Arkansas,
wrote a few years ago with regard to teacher unions trying to strangle
charter schools with red tape, “Vouchers made the world safe for charters by drawing union fire.” But, he warned, when the unions have the
voucher threat under control, “charters are in trouble.”68
What is needed in each state is an informal coalition of school choice
advocates who can regularly share information about new initiatives
and problem areas to monitor. This would hopefully lead to a more
supportive strategy among school choice advocates when legislative
changes or initiatives are being considered.
Rather than promoting only one school choice option, school choice
advocates should recognize that each approach has strengths and
weaknesses. Tax credits are valuable in situations in which religious
schools cannot participate in voucher programs, whereas vouchers
have the best odds of meeting most of the requirements for creating a
competitive marketplace for education. Embracing this more inclusive
approach to expanding educational choice and providing mutual support across program boundaries would do much to advance the common cause of improving U.S. K–12 education.
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4. Giving Credit Where Credits Are Due:
Revisiting the Voucher vs. Tax Credit Debate
Jason Bedrick

Andrew J. Coulson burst onto the education policy scene in 1999 with
the publication of his seminal book, Market Education: The Unknown History. A former software engineer for Microsoft, he soon rose to prominence as perhaps the foremost advocate for expanding educational
freedom through tax credits. When Market Education hit the shelves,
Arizona was the only state with a scholarship tax credit program. Since
then, 16 more states have adopted similar policies. As of the 2015–16 academic year, nearly 220,000 students nationwide were using tax credit
scholarships to attend the schools their families chose—considerably
more than the almost 174,000 students participating in publicly funded
private education programs, primarily with vouchers.1
Although he did not oppose school voucher programs,2 Coulson
sometimes rankled others in the school choice movement with his unvarnished criticism of their flaws. He readily conceded that there are
tradeoffs—most notably regarding the simplicity of implementation and
potential to scale up. But Coulson nevertheless argued forcefully that a
system of tax credits for both parents and donors to scholarship organizations is superior to school vouchers for constitutional, philosophical,
and policy reasons. In this chapter, I will revisit his central arguments for
tax credits and concerns about public funding in light of the advent of a
new educational choice mechanism: education savings accounts (ESAs).
In Search of Educational Excellence
In Market Education, Coulson analyzed education systems around
the world and throughout history, from classical Greece to the present
day, to determine what worked, what didn’t, and why. After years of
painstaking research, he concluded that the best education systems—
regardless of culture or era—had five key elements: “choice and
financial responsibility for parents, and freedom, competition, and the
profit motive for schools—in essence, a free market in education.”3
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Coulson subsequently tested his theory by reviewing the global research. After analyzing more than 150 statistical comparisons across
eight different educational outcomes, Coulson found that private
schools consistently outperformed government-run schools, and that
the most market-like education systems—those that had the five key
elements he had previously identified—were even more likely to have
a statistically significant advantage over state monopolies.4
Coulson’s conclusions ran counter to the prevailing view of education, which had its roots in the ideas of Horace Mann and the “common school” reformers who built the system in which most American
children are still educated. Their key premise, according to Coulson,
was that “state-appointed experts would make better educational decisions for children than would those children’s own parents.”5 Rather
than having parents choose and pay for their children’s schooling,
Coulson wrote that Mann believed children should be sent to “a system
of schools operated by the state, free of charge, with state-appointed
experts overseeing their content, teacher training, and administration.”6
Since all the schools were held to the same standards and were publicly
funded, there would be no need to compete, let alone earn profits.
By the modern era, Mann’s views had become the conventional wisdom among the public schooling establishment. Coulson’s read of the
historical and international empirical evidence led him not only to reject Mann’s views but also to criticize the approach of other ostensibly
pro-market education reformers:
Nearly all pundits and reformers assume that education markets
compose a smorgasbord from which we can select or reject policy
details according to personal taste or political expediency. This
assumption, rarely acknowledged and never defended, is wrong.
Properly functioning education markets much more closely resemble delicate ecosystems in which the alteration or removal of
key elements leads to the decline or collapse of the entire system.7

For example, charter schools—long the darling of education
reformers—are an improvement over the status quo, but they do not
have all five elements that Coulson identified as necessary for a wellfunctioning market in education. Chartering may have expanded parents’ options, exposed schools to greater competition, and even opened
some opportunity for profit, but parents lack any financial responsibility and the level of school autonomy is far more limited than that enjoyed by private schools.
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Although he believed they were superior to charters, Coulson also
had concerns about private school vouchers. Historical experience
in America and other countries suggested that government funding
brought government control that often undermined the essential market mechanisms he had identified. Moreover, whereas the U.S. Supreme
Court had ruled vouchers constitutional under the First Amendment,
Coulson warned that provisions in state constitutions—particularly
Blaine amendments and compelled support clauses—would prevent
policymakers from enacting voucher programs, or at least limit them
to a relatively small number of secular private schools. For that matter,
Coulson was not entirely unsympathetic to the spirit of those constitutional provisions. He believed Thomas Jefferson was right in declaring that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and
tyrannical.”8
By contrast, Coulson argued, tax credits avoid these issues because
they involve having parents or donors spend their own money for educational purposes. No parent or taxpayer is compelled to contribute
toward the propagation of ideas they dislike, which in turn means that
the tax credits do not violate the Blaine Amendment or compelled support clauses. Moreover, policymakers are less likely to regulate parents’
use of their own money (or that of a donor) than they are to regulate the
use of public funds.
Although I had been a voucher proponent, Coulson’s arguments persuaded me of the superiority of tax credits. I am similarly persuaded
that publicly funded education savings accounts are superior to vouchers. Whereas vouchers are limited to schools, ESAs embody a more expansive vision of education that empowers parents to customize their
child’s education through tutoring, online courses, homeschool materials, and more. Likewise, because parents can use ESA funds to purchase
a variety of educational goods and services and save unused funds for
later, they do not create a voucher-style price floor and they encourage
greater price-consciousness.
Someone who believes in the superiority of both tax credits and ESAs
over traditional vouchers might logically conclude that the best vehicle
for expanding educational choice would combine the two policies. As I
have explained elsewhere, it is possible for policymakers to design ESA
programs that are funded through tax credits for both parental contributions and third-party donations.9 However, because public funding
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is more scalable and because some of the design features of ESAs may
mitigate Coulson’s primary concerns about constitutionality and the
potential for over-regulation, it is worth reexamining the tradeoffs between tax credits and public funding.
Toward Market Education: Public Funding vs. Tax Credits
Coulson argued that funding private education through tax credits is
superior to public funding because tax credits expand freedom of conscience for taxpayers, are more likely to be found constitutional, and are
less likely to come with deleterious regulatory strings attached. In the
following, I consider the merits of these arguments, especially as they
pertain to ESAs.

Credits, Coercion, and Constitutionality
In its landmark decision Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a school voucher program in Ohio against a First Amendment challenge. The Court ruled
that the program was constitutional because it was “enacted for the
valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children,” that it was “neutral with respect to religion,” and that any funds
that indirectly reached a religious school were the incidental result of
parents’ “own genuine and independent private choice.”10
Although vouchers do not implicate the Establishment Clause, all but
three state constitutions contain a compelled support clause, a Blaine
Amendment, or both. The former date back to the colonial era and
generally forbid the state from compelling citizens to support religious
institutions against their consent. The latter, named for the infamous
nativist Sen. James G. Blaine of Maine, were primarily fueled by animus
toward Catholics in the late 19th century and generally forbid the state
from funding “sectarian” schools, a thinly veiled reference to Catholic
schools in an era when the so-called common schools taught the Bible
and prayed in accordance with nondenominational Protestant beliefs
and practice.
Although those clauses can pose a significant hurdle to enacting
publicly funded school choice programs—some state supreme courts
have ruled that they prohibit vouchers—education tax credits have a
perfect record of surviving such constitutional challenges because tax
credits constitute private, not public, funds. However, Coulson was
prone to overestimate the height of this hurdle. After the Supreme
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Court of Wisconsin upheld the Milwaukee voucher program as constitutional under both its compelled support clause and Blaine Amendment in 1998, Coulson expressed surprise at their “inexplicable legal
magic” and cautioned that “their dazzling léger-de-loi may be difficult
to replicate.”11 However, replication was not as difficult as Coulson
predicted. Since then, the high courts in Ohio (1999), Indiana (2013),
Alabama (2015),12 Oklahoma (2016), and Nevada (2016) have followed
Wisconsin’s lead in declaring publicly funded voucher programs constitutional. Only the state supreme court of Arizona and a plurality of
the Colorado Supreme Court have cited these provisions to strike down
voucher programs.
Upholding public funding under these constitutional provisions
does not require “legal magic” but rather careful design. The Blaine
amendments were intended to prohibit the direct funding of sectarian
schools, but under school voucher programs, the state funds parents,
not schools. The compelled support clauses were intended to prevent
the state from establishing a religion, funding the church or ministries
of religious groups, or compelling people to attend churches, as was
often the practice in the early American colonies. School voucher programs, however, are religiously neutral—parents can choose to use the
vouchers at schools representing a variety of religious affiliations or
none at all. No one is compelled to attend a religious school against
their consent, and the state neither favors nor disfavors any particular
religion, or religion in general. Voters are no more compelled to support
religious schooling via their taxes than they are compelled to support
ideas they “disbelieve and abhor” taught in their local district school—
a fact to which I will return in a moment. Depending on the phrasing of
a particular state’s constitutional provisions and its history of interpreting them, it is easy to see how school vouchers can be consistent with
both the spirit and letter of most state constitutions. According to the
Institute for Justice, the pro-liberty law firm with the most experience
litigating school choice cases nationwide, beyond Colorado, there are
only 17 states where these provisions likely prohibit public funding,
which is fewer than half the states that have such constitutional provisions.13 (In addition, Florida’s supreme court struck down a voucher
program under its uniformity clause in a deeply flawed decision that
other states’ high courts have not replicated.)
Moreover, publicly funded ESAs may survive constitutional challenges in places where vouchers would not. Although the Arizona
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Supreme Court struck down a voucher program in 2009, it left an
opening for ESAs. The court ruled in Cain v. Horne that the vouchers
ran afoul of Arizona’s Blaine Amendment because the funds could only
be used for private-school tuition, and most of the private schools in the
state were religiously affiliated. However, during oral arguments, even
the petitioners agreed that if private-school tuition had been only one
of many possible uses for the funds, the program would have passed
constitutional muster. Choice advocates responded by proposing and
eventually enacting an ESA plan that empowers parents to purchase a
wide variety of educational products and services. After a lower court
ruled Arizona’s ESA constitutional in 2013, the state supreme court let
the decision stand.
Whether other state supreme courts follow suit is yet to be seen,
but there is reason to think that they might. All states have publicly
funded programs that aid low-income citizens in obtaining basic goods
and services, even from religiously affiliated providers or for religious
purposes. Recipients of state-funded Medicaid vouchers can obtain services at Catholic hospitals with a priest on the staff and a crucifix in every room. They can use food vouchers for religious feasts. They can host
religious services or Bible studies in their publicly subsidized homes.
And even in states that don’t have a state version of the Pell Grant, they
can use welfare income to cover tuition at religious colleges or pre-K–12
schools.
Moreover, even if some state courts adopt a restrictive interpretation of their religion clauses, they may be overruled. The U.S. Supreme
Court may soon consider two cases on the constitutionality of states’
enacting aid programs that exclude groups because of their religious
beliefs. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley, the Court is
asked to consider whether Missouri was constitutionally permitted to
deny a church-affiliated daycare center’s application to the state’s Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grant Program solely because of
its religious affiliation. Petitioners contend that the U.S. Constitution’s
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses require the government to be
neutral with regard to religion—as the Supreme Court has previously
held in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993) and
other decisions—and therefore prohibit states from both favoring and
disfavoring religious groups. As this book goes to print, the case has
been granted certiorari, but oral arguments have not yet been scheduled. In Douglas County School District v. Taxpayers for Public Education,
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the Court is asked whether it was constitutional for a plurality of the
Colorado Supreme Court to mandate the exclusion of religious schools
from the Douglas County school voucher program under the state’s
Blaine Amendment. As in Trinity, the petitioners assert that the U.S.
Constitution requires that such aid programs be religiously neutral.
A judgment for the petitioners in either case (but particularly the second) would pave the way for publicly funded school choice programs
to be constitutional in nearly every state.14
Constitutionality aside, Coulson still favored tax credits over public
funding because the former do not compel taxpayers to financially support ideas they may find disagreeable. After the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Arizona’s scholarship tax credit program, he wrote
the following:
The Supreme Court’s [Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v.] Winn ruling reminds us . . . that there is a way to
finance universal education without resorting to socially corrosive compulsion. Indeed if we wish our schools to promote
mutual respect among people of different religions and world
views, we must respect the right of parents to offer their children an education consistent with their values, and we must
not compel taxpayers to support forms of instruction that violate their convictions. Tax credit programs such as Arizona’s do
both.15

Of course, as Coulson recognized, America’s system of public schooling already compels taxpayers to support forms of instruction that violate their convictions. Coulson certainly preferred a system in which
no one is compelled because financially supporting education is entirely voluntary, but that is not a politically viable option today or in
the foreseeable future. The question before us is whether it is better
(1) to compel all people (through their taxes) to support the one type of
schooling that reflects the views of the majority (or a politically powerful minority), allowing them to support other educational views only
through voluntary contributions; or (2) to allow all parents access to
public funds to purchase instruction in line with their own convictions.
There is no obviously correct answer here. Enacting education tax
credits alongside the existing government-run school system would,
relative to vouchers, at least limit the types of instruction that taxpayers
are compelled to support. But it is unequal in compelling everyone to
support one type of education (the public school system) to the exclusion
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of all others. In a system of publicly funded choice, everyone is equally
compelled to support all types of education, at least indirectly. Imagine
a world in which nearly everyone agrees that the state must purchase
a fruit for every citizen every day, and in which most people prefer
apples but others prefer oranges, plums, or pears. Imagine further that
the choice of one fruit offends the moral sensibilities of those who have
different tastes. Would it be more just and fair to compel everyone to
support the provision of apples while those who prefer other fruits
must solicit their neighbors for tax credit–eligible donations? Or should
an equal amount of public funds be allocated to each citizen to purchase the fruit of their choice? If ending all such compulsion (whether
to support the purchase of fruit or education) is not politically viable, it
is understandable why even the most ardent libertarians might prefer
the second option.
Coulson was right that tax credits could survive constitutional scrutiny even in states where vouchers could not, although his assessment
of the constitutional threat to public funding was overstated. In states
that are constitutionally forbidden from publicly funding school choice
programs, tax credits are obviously the superior (and perhaps only)
alternative.16 Nevertheless, public funding is constitutional in about
four-fifths of states, and the U.S. Supreme Court may strike down state
constitutional provisions that mandate active discrimination against
religious groups in otherwise neutral aid programs. Coulson was also
right that tax credits entail less coercion, in that no one is compelled to
support private education through their taxes. But so long as everyone
is compelled to support some types of education through their taxes, it
is not clear that granting public funding to some but not others is more
just or fair. In states where public funding is constitutional, policymakers should primarily consider the policy implications of choosing public funding or tax credits.

The Elements of a Market in Education
In his essay, “On the Way to School,” Coulson asked, “Is there any
sort of financial assistance program that can ensure universal access to
a free education marketplace without destroying the conditions necessary for that market to survive and thrive?”17 As noted, Coulson
identified five key elements necessary for a well-functioning market
in education: parental choice and financial responsibility, instructional
freedom for schools, competition, and the profit motive. Additionally,
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the market must be large enough to ensure robust competition among
a wide and diverse set of educational options. Small choice programs
do little more than fill empty seats at existing private schools. Universal
access is required to unleash the dynamism and innovation that make
choice and competition meaningful. The ideal choice program, therefore, would provide sufficient funding for universal access to a quality
education without undermining the key elements of an effective market
in education. As Coulson wrote,
What really matters, from a policy standpoint, is how many additional families a program helps to gain access to the education marketplace, and what its prospects are for growth in that
area. This is a function of several factors, including the average
benefit size, average private school tuition, the number of participating families and the prospects for growth in that number.
The program that will allow the most people to gain access to
the education marketplace is not necessarily the one that has
the biggest total dollar value (average benefit size multiplied by
program enrollment), but the one that lowers the perceived cost
of private schooling in a meaningful way for the most families.18

Even setting aside programs for students with special needs, the
value of the average voucher is more than double the value of the average tax credit scholarship nationwide (about $6,300 versus about
$2,500 in the 2015–16 academic year).19 And although more students
in the United States are receiving tax credit scholarships than vouchers, there’s some evidence that voucher programs scale up faster. Indiana’s tax credit scholarship program launched in 2010, and enrollment
peaked at just over 11,000 in 2013–14 before declining to just under
9,500 in 2014–15.20 Indiana’s voucher program launched in 2011, and
enrollment surpassed 30,000 students in the same time period.21 Likewise, Louisiana’s tax credit scholarship program took effect in 2012
and served fewer than 800 students in 2015–16, whereas more than
7,000 students participate in the state’s voucher program.22 Of course,
it’s possible—even likely—that the voucher programs are “cannibalizing” participation in the tax credit scholarship programs because they
are worth more money (about 40 percent more in Louisiana and nearly
2.5 times as much in Indiana), but the higher values also likely attract
more participants in total.
Although not conclusive, the evidence suggests that publicly funded
programs are more likely to provide more money to more students
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than tax credits (although still significantly less per pupil than what
the district schools spend, meaning that higher participation will produce a net savings to taxpayers) and to scale up more quickly. The
question then becomes whether the increased participation from public funding is undermined by the regulatory strings that might come
attached.
In theory, it is possible for states to regulate schools even without
providing them any financial support, either through vouchers or tax
credits, and in some states the regulatory burden is substantial even
in the absence of school choice programs. However, it is also true that
school choice programs tend to include some amount of additional
regulations. In 2011, Coulson conducted a statistical analysis of existing voucher and scholarship tax credit programs to determine which
ones were more likely to include regulations that undermine the elements of a well-functioning market in education. These regulations
included price controls, admissions requirements, curriculum regulations, testing mandates, barriers to entry, restrictions on religious freedom, staffing regulations, financial regulations, and facilities regulations. The study found that “vouchers, but not tax credits, impose a
substantial and statistically significant additional regulatory burden
on participating private schools,” especially in terms of price controls
(requiring that schools not charge more than the value of the voucher),
admissions (requiring voucher-accepting schools to have an open admissions policy), and testing mandates.23 Although the sample size
was relatively small, Coulson noted that the “variation in regulation
within states is much greater than the variation between states,” indicating that policymakers tend to approach the two types of choice
policies differently.
In 2014, the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice (now EdChoice) published a study by Andrew D. Catt that largely reached the
same conclusion as Coulson. Notably, Catt found that most of the regulations that private schools face were in place before the enactment of
any school choice program, although vouchers did tend to increase the
regulatory burden. Tax credits, by contrast, were given a lighter regulatory touch. In Catt’s scoring system, voucher programs had “regulatory
impact scores slightly more than three times as negative as the scores of
tax-credit scholarship programs.”24 When controlling for outliers, such
as programs for students with special needs, the voucher scores were
five times as negative as the tax credits. Catt’s study was also the first
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to look at the regulatory impact of the first education savings account
program in Arizona and concluded that it was the least regulated of any
choice program in the country.
Of course, it is impossible to generalize from a single program.
However, since then, four more states have adopted ESAs: Florida,
Mississippi, Nevada, and Tennessee. As in Arizona, none have price
controls or admissions requirements, although Florida, Nevada, and
Tennessee require that students take their choice of the state test or a
nationally norm-referenced test. However, the state does not impose
any consequences on the students or on any private schools or other
education providers related to the test results.
This is no mere coincidence. The regulatory framework of the existing ESA programs reflects both their underlying theory and practical difficulties in attaching voucher-style regulations to ESAs. ESAs
are supposed to be an evolution from “school choice” to “educational choice,” recognizing that not all formal education must take
place in a traditional school classroom. ESAs empower parents to
choose among a wide variety of educational products and services,
including tutors, textbooks, online courses, homeschool curricula,
educational therapy, and more—either in addition to or instead of
private school tuition. The regulatory framework that has developed
to regulate schools is not easily transferred to these other education
providers.
Take testing, for example. For both vouchers and tax credit scholarships, it is relatively easy for policymakers to mandate that schools
administer the state test, and then reward or punish them on the basis
of the results. By contrast, with ESAs, that is practically impossible.
When a student spends part of her day in a traditional school, part of
the day taking courses online, part of the day with a tutor, and part of
the day studying a homeschool curriculum, which of those education
providers is the state supposed to hold responsible for that student’s
test scores? Policymakers can still mandate that students take a standardized test; but if they can’t hold any particular provider primarily
accountable for the results, the mandate is unlikely to create the sort
of perverse incentives to narrow the curriculum and teach to the test
that we have seen arise elsewhere. Instead, the tests merely provide
parents with information that they likely desired anyway, which they
can then factor in among the many other variables that are important
to them.
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Similarly, it is more difficult for policymakers to impose price controls on ESAs. As it is, ESAs are superior to traditional vouchers because they do not create a price floor. They’re also less likely to create price ceilings. Although it is technically possible for policymakers
to cap private school tuition at the full amount of the annual ESA allocations, doing so would not make much sense. The purpose of an
ESA is to empower parents to customize their child’s education using a wide variety of products and services. It is beyond the ability of
policymakers to control the prices for all of these. Setting the maximum
price for tuition is politically and practically feasible, if unwise. Setting
a maximum price for all tutors, textbooks, online courses, educational
therapies, and so on is neither politically nor practically feasible. Because policymakers are unlikely to attempt to control the price of only
one of numerous categories of eligible purchases, ESAs do not pose the
same threat as vouchers.
The same goes for admissions requirements. It is relatively easy for
policymakers to require that all schools accepting vouchers (or even tax
credit scholarships) admit all students who apply or hold a lottery if
there is oversubscription. However, it is politically and practically difficult to do so for every tutor or online course, and no state has even
attempted it.
The technocratic reformers who support additional choice along
with additional state regulations recognize the difficulty with imposing their preferred regulatory framework on ESAs, which is why their
support for ESA initiatives has been tepid at best. In Nevada, some
technocratic school choice advocates refused to support or even openly
opposed the ESA legislation.25 Of course, what they see as a bug is really a feature.
Conclusion: Forging a New Consensus
It remains to be seen whether publicly funded ESAs will be able to
provide universal access to a free market in education without introducing harmful regulations that undermine that market. As outlined
in this chapter, there are reasons for optimism. But anyone who has
studied Coulson’s work knows there are also reasons for skepticism. Of
course, even in the absence of educational choice policies, there are no
guarantees that the state will refrain from imposing well-intentioned
but misguided regulations—the price of educational freedom is eternal
vigilance.
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Like Coulson, we should rigorously examine the evidence before us
in pursuit of the ideal education system—one that provides every child
with access to a high-quality education that meets his or her unique
learning needs. Coulson’s pioneering work examining education systems across the globe and throughout history has shown that such a
system would give parents both choice and responsibility and give education providers freedom to determine their own curricula and earn a
profit in a competitive environment. Education reformers today may
or may not reach the same conclusions as Coulson as to which policies
best embody the elements he identified, but we are all forever indebted
to him for his contributions to the pursuit of educational excellence.
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5. On Coulson’s Historical Perspective
Jay P. Greene and Jason Bedrick

Current education policy debates seem to have little use for historical
analysis. We leap into a brave new world with little concern for what
has happened before. And as long as our program evaluations show
positive results (and sometimes even that doesn’t matter), we feel confident that we are guided by science even if we ignore the past. Andrew
Coulson’s scholarship serves as a reminder to the education policy
world how important studying history remains despite advances in
rigorous empirical analysis. This is true for several reasons, which we
will enumerate in this chapter.
History as a Guide for the Future
First, program evaluations do not tell us what programs should be
implemented so that they can be studied. Before we assess the effectiveness of any intervention, we first have to decide that an intervention is worth trying. There were no evaluations of private school choice
before policymakers adopted the Milwaukee voucher program. There
were no studies on the effects of charter schools before Minnesota first
tried them.
While those exact programs had never been tried before, they were
not completely lacking in historical antecedents. As Coulson described
in his book, Market Education: The Unknown History, private markets for
education existed and thrived in the past in a variety of cultures and
eras from ancient Greece to modern Japan. Although no single case
study can conclusively demonstrate the effectiveness of a particular
system or intervention, patterns of results spanning time and cultures
are suggestive. As Coulson explained,
If a particular approach to organizing and funding schools consistently works well across widely varying circumstances, and
if it consistently outperforms other systems when operating in
similar circumstances, we can be confident that this pattern of
results is due to the system itself, and not simply an accident
of circumstance. In fact, the greater the cultural and economic
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differences among the nations and historical periods studied,
the more compelling any consistent pattern of results becomes.1

The divergent education systems in cosmopolitan Athens and militant Sparta make for a useful comparison. The Spartan government
exercised complete control over every boy’s education, training each
for battle in state-run boarding facilities starting at age seven. Athenians took a more laissez-faire approach. Teachers like Socrates were
free to start their own schools and set their own curricula. Their success
depended on their ability to attract students, which meant that they
had to not only keep their fees competitive, but also teach the content
and skills that parents desired for their children. Whereas the mostly
illiterate Spartans languished in a cultural and economic backwater,
the highly literate Athenians produced a thriving economy and made
great contributions to philosophy, science, and the arts that are still
admired today.
America has its own history of market education. At the time of the
American Revolution, education in many towns was “financed by a
combination of tuition charges and local taxes, which allowed some
of the poorer students to attend for free while those who could afford
to largely paid their own way.”2 Although not exactly vouchers or
charter schools, these examples can provide at least some support to
largely theoretical arguments for experimenting with new school choice
arrangements. Historical analyses cannot prove the effectiveness of any
particular policy, but they can at least suggest what policies are possible
and might be desirable.
Thinking Outside Existing Arrangements
Second, historical analyses help reveal what aspects of current arrangements may or may not be necessary for achieving certain policy
goals. We grow accustomed so quickly to education policies that we
often forget that they did not always exist. The existence of state educational standards goes back only a few decades, but some who debate
current education policy seem to have difficulty imagining how schools
could operate without being told what to teach by state or even national
officials. Nationwide, schools have been state-operated for barely more
than a century, yet many people have trouble conceiving how the state
might change its role from operating schools to just helping pay for
them. We are falsely told that state-operated schools are the foundation
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of our democracy, ignoring that Horace Mann didn’t start the push
for public schools until more than half a century after the Republic’s
founding.
Not only were Americans able to articulate democratic ideals, engage
in a revolution to achieve them, and operate a fairly successful Republic
without any state-operated schools, but also levels of literacy were generally quite high in the absence of state schooling. By the time the U.S.
Constitution was drafted in 1787, about two-thirds of free men were
literate nationwide, and that ratio was closer to 80 percent in New England. By 1850, before “common schools” were widespread, only about 1
in 10 people identified themselves as illiterate on the U.S. census.3
A similar pattern was evident across the pond. As Coulson noted in
his analysis of English education, “Clearly the spread of literacy up to
the 1830s was achieved in spite of, rather than thanks to, state intervention.”4 The English did not begin publicly subsidizing education until
1833, and state-run schools were not introduced until 1870. By that time,
English men were nearly universally literate, and “virtually all children
were receiving some schooling.”5 Although the goal of Forster’s Education Act of 1870 was, ostensibly, to expand access to education among
the poor, the newly created system of state-subsidized schools mainly
just cannibalized private school enrollment. By then, even the poorest
and least-educated parents in Britain commonly enrolled their children
at fee-charging private schools. About a decade after the introduction of
state-run schools, the rate of children receiving an education was about
the same, but the private schools had mostly closed down. “In essence,”
Coulson observed, “government intervention in education served primarily to extinguish private schools, rather than to increase the percentage of children receiving an education.”6
History is not a steady march of progress with all government programs improving our lives. Sometimes those programs have made our
lives worse or played no role in the progress that was otherwise occurring. By studying history we not only learn what policies might be
possible and desirable, but we also gain insight into what policies might
not be necessary or inevitable. If we once were able to live well without a
government program, perhaps we could again live very well without
it. Empirical evaluations, unlike historical analyses, cannot tell us what
policies to try or what policies we might be able to do without.
By the same token, historical analyses can help us identify conditions that are necessary for a well-functioning education system. At the
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conclusion of his book, Coulson argued that at least five key elements
have proven necessary across centuries and continents for an effective
market in education: parental choice, parental financial responsibility,
educational freedom, competition, and the profit motive. When parents
can choose their child’s learning environment, they tend to be more involved with their child’s education, and the schools are more likely to
keep pace with the needs of the times—so long as they have the freedom to do so. The more options there are, the greater the pressure to
meet parents’ needs at a reasonable price. However, he who pays the
school piper calls the instructional tune; the price of parental control
is bearing at least some financial responsibility. And finally, allowing
schools to seek profits fosters innovation, encourages greater efficiency
and cost control, and provides an incentive to scale up.
When one or more of these elements are not present, the effectiveness of the market is diminished. Louisiana’s voucher program, for example, contains a host of regulations that diminish or eliminate these
features. By requiring voucher-accepting schools to administer the state
test, the state indirectly restricts the schools’ freedom to set their own
curriculum. In capping the price of tuition and forbidding schools from
charging parents more than the value of the voucher, the program effectively eliminates any parental financial responsibility. By mandating
open admissions, the state essentially prevents schools from determining their own character or identity, thereby narrowing the diversity of
options available to parents. As a consequence of these regulations,
only about one-third of private schools in Louisiana have been willing
to accept the vouchers. No one who has read Market Education will be
surprised to learn that the first—and so far only—negative results obtained from a random-assignment study of a voucher program were in
Louisiana.7
Figuring Out What’s Important
Third, we need historical analyses to help us decide which outcomes
we should even be examining in our program evaluations. Rigorous
evaluations provide a method for identifying the effects of policies, but
they don’t tell us which effects are important. These days, we typically
focus on evaluating how policy interventions affect test scores, but we
do so largely because test results are readily available, not because they
are strongly predictive of later life outcomes or capturing things that
matter most. As we learn from Coulson’s historical work, the important
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effects of government education policies often involve suppressing
political dissent, favoring particular religious views, and controlling
economic activity. These effects matter enormously to people and yet
are virtually never captured in program evaluations.
To this day, public schools are widely assumed to be a unifying force
in our diverse society, the supposed “cornerstone of democracy,” where
students of all colors and creeds come together. In fact, as Coulson meticulously details, public schooling has often been the source of social
strife. Before the rise of public schooling, parents enrolled their children
in schools that aligned with their values and matched their educational
preferences. Far from producing the “balkanization” feared today, history shows us that diverse communities could live together in harmony
when they did not have to struggle with their neighbors over what their
children were taught:
In areas where schools of different sects coexisted, they and
their patrons seldom came into conflict, since they did not try
to foist their views on one another. They lived and let live in
what were comparatively stable, though increasingly diverse,
communities. It was only after the state began creating uniform
institutions for all children that these families were thrown into
conflict.8

By its very nature, state control over schooling produces winners and
losers in a diverse society. Public schools pit parents with conflicting
views about education against each other in a struggle to have their
views and values taught to their children—and everyone else’s:
Within public schools, many parents were faced with an unpleasant choice: accept that objectionable ideas would be forced
on their children, or force their own ideas on everyone else’s
children by taking control of the system. It was this artificial
choice between two evils that led to the Philadelphia Bible
Riots, the beatings of Catholic children, the official denigration of immigrant values and lifestyles in public schools and
textbooks, and laws—which would today be viewed as utterly
unconstitutional—forcing the Protestant Bible on all families.
The unpardonable treatment of black families by government
schools, which persisted for over a century, does nothing to
lighten this grim picture.9

We don’t have Bible riots anymore—thank heaven—but parents still
find plenty to fight about, whether it be pedagogy, sex ed, the science
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curriculum, freedom of expression, what constitutes appropriate reading material, and so on. If social harmony is one of our goals, the study
of history is a better guide than any regression analysis.
Learning from Past Mistakes
Fourth, a study of history can help us avoid the mistakes of the past.
Wave after wave of education reformers have promised utopia only to
have their hopes and dreams dashed against the rocky shoals of reality. All too often, the reformers’ failure has stemmed, in part, from the
hubristic assumption that they knew better than parents. The declaration by the California State Superintendent of Public Instruction in 1864
that children “should be taught to consider [their] instructor, in many
respects, superior to the parent in point of authority,” or the Wisconsin
Teachers’ Association’s assertion that “children are the property of the
state” are notions that have currency even today.10 Rather than attempt
to persuade parents to embrace their vision, reformers have instead
attempted to force them to comply. As Coulson details—in a book, it
should be remembered, published before the era of Common Core or
No Child Left Behind—reformers’ attempts to circumvent parents tend
to fail.
Education reformers talk a lot about the future of education but not
enough about the past. As we seek to improve or redesign the system
we have, we would do well to study how and why we got here, and how
education systems developed differently elsewhere. Historical analysis
can provide a deeper understanding of what features of our education
system are necessary or superfluous and give us a broader perspective
as to the outcomes we should seek to evaluate. A better understanding
of history would also instill a vital sense of humility about what reformers can accomplish, especially through the clumsy hand of the state. In
Market Education and his subsequent work, Andrew Coulson contributed mightily toward developing that understanding. May his legacy
inspire us to continue down the path he illuminated.
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6. Education, Markets, and Governments:
Andrew Coulson’s Global Research
Agenda and Legacy
James Tooley

The last time I spent with Andrew Coulson was in 2014, at a small
dinner in Hyderabad, India. We were celebrating the completion of his
filming of low-cost private schools in poor parts of Hyderabad’s Old
City. These were some of the schools I had written about extensively
in The Beautiful Tree.1 Coulson had described me in an article about my
work as “a 21st-century Indiana Jones,” who travels to “the remotest
regions on Earth researching something many regard as mythical.” That
mythical something was low-cost schools, which many refused to believe in even after I’d been presenting evidence on them for some years.2
I liked that image of myself, that identity Coulson had given me.
Indiana Jones said, “If you want to be a good archaeologist, you gotta
get out of the library,” and Coulson believed this to be true for education policy as well. For his film on school choice—his magnum opus,
School Inc.: Taking Educational Excellence from Candle to Flame—he was
most definitely out of the ivory tower, engaging with those involved
in educational entrepreneurship all over the world, including some of
its poorest places. He had an abiding interest in markets in education
wherever they could be found, learning lessons for their own sake and
also for influencing the American school choice debate.
In this chapter, I will point to some of Coulson’s enduring research
in this area of international education, to give a flavor of some of his
concerns, to inspire us to go back to his original work, and to explore
further research questions that grow out of his legacy. I will explore
two of his major themes: first, the dangers of government control of
curriculum and, second, comparisons between government and market systems of education. I’ll conclude by summarizing some findings
about markets in education in some of the poorest parts of the world,
which considerably interested Andrew Coulson.
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Dangers of Government Control of Curriculum
A major theme in Coulson’s work was the danger inherent in government control of curriculum. It is a theme in his magisterial Market
Education: The Unknown History,3 in which he traced the history of governments across time and place controlling curriculum for purposes
of indoctrination. He brought that same theme up to date in his Cato
Policy Analysis, “Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim World,”
and it continues to grow in relevance. He wrote in the latter:
State-run schooling has always been one of the primary tools of
tyrants. One of the most common first steps of would-be dictators is to shut down or take over private schools and then infuse
the system with a curriculum that consolidates support for their
regimes and agendas. Lycurgus did it in the Greek city-state of
Sparta two and one-half millennia ago, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Castro and Saddam Hussein all did it in the 20th century.4

Harvard University’s Lant Pritchett has pointed to similar evidence
of state-run schooling, including in Japan during the early Meiji period
and Turkey under Atatürk, where the government imperative seems to
be to control the curriculum for purposes of socialization and indoctrination. He suggests that the desire for such control is an inevitability of
government education. Pritchett’s argument is complex but is based on
the premise that “instruction in beliefs is not third-party contractible, so
organizations will choose to make, not buy, the inculcation of beliefs.”5
Essentially, given that governments of nation-states want appropriately
socialized populations, and given the emergence of schooling as a useful vehicle for that socialization, governments will inevitably use public
schooling for the purpose of socialization. In its extreme manifestations,
that will mean schooling for the purposes of indoctrination. There is
nothing much we can do about this inevitability.
Although Coulson did not comment specifically on Pritchett’s work,
his own writing makes clear that he would have thought Pritchett
guilty of a naturalistic fallacy here: moving from “is” to “ought.” Yes,
Coulson certainly agreed that this is what governments have done, historically and globally, and are still doing. They control the curriculum
of education and use it for socialization and, at worst, indoctrination.
But Coulson’s purpose in highlighting and exposing this tendency appears to have been precisely because he believed that with vigilance we
can help challenge and combat it for the sake of educational freedom.
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In particular, his comments about private education in this context suggest that he saw private education as a viable route away from government control, including control of the curriculum and its potential
connection with indoctrination.
Coulson gave some chilling examples of recent ways in which the
United States has been involved not only in this socialization process for
itself, but also in using education for indoctrination in other countries.
This happened in the late 20th century through America’s “manipulation of Pakistan’s Islamist madrasas.”6 As a result of the Soviet Union’s
invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter sought to cause covert
damage to Soviet operations, in part through a process of indoctrination in Pakistani schools. “Between 1986 and 1992, USAID [the United
States Agency for International Development] underwrote the printing
of explicitly violent Islamic textbooks for elementary school children,”
Coulson wrote.7 The “recurrent theme” of these textbooks aimed at
children in the first through sixth grades, “was the promotion of Islam
through violence.”8 He noted that these textbooks took “rather a different tack than Dr. Seuss,” assigning letters of the alphabet to words for
Allah and jihad and so on.9 Even in subjects that one might have thought
relatively immune to this treatment, indoctrination seems to have been
rampant. Here is an example from a fourth-grade mathematics text:
The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. . . .
If a Russian is at a distance of 3,200 meters from a mujahid, and
that mujahid aims at the Russian’s head, calculate how many
seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the
forehead.10

Clearly, Coulson remarked, this kind of U.S. intervention was morally wrong: “Whereas adult mujaheddin could freely choose whether
or not to fight the Soviets, we helped them rob their children of that free
will, molding them into jihadis before they were old enough to think
for themselves. This put us in the company of the most wicked dictators in history.”11 Funding indoctrinating textbooks was also misguided
pragmatically: “Whatever short-term benefit they may have provided
in helping to halt Soviet expansionism is clearly outweighed by the
generations of violent Islamists these books have helped to create.”12
The textbooks apparently remain “popular with militant Islamists in
northern Pakistan,” although now they are reprinted unofficially and
“no longer at U.S. expense.”13
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Changing times brought changing needs. In 2003, under President
George W. Bush, USAID changed tack and committed to fund the
Pakistani government’s Education Sector Reform strategy. This time
the emphasis was on countering militant Islam by improving government schools, rather than on promoting it as before. Coulson thought
this approach was misguided too, innocent of the way that Pakistan
government–controlled curriculum took socialization to high levels:
“Even Pakistan’s most recent post-ESR [Education Sector Reform]
textbooks instill animosity toward and mistrust of Hindus and
Indians, glorify jihad and martyrdom in the name of Allah, encourage
militarism, contain devotional religious instruction, and are insensitive
to Pakistan’s religious diversity.”14
Coulson believed this tack—and a similar one in Iraq, where the
American government was trying to impose a centralized schooling system, open to the danger of mass indoctrination—was entirely
wrong. It focused on what governments demand from education rather
than on what parents seek for their children. The alternative, he said,
is to look to the private sector. Private schools across the developing
world, he said, “are consistently more responsive to parents’ demands.
As a result, these schools are far less likely to try to indoctrinate children. . . . When choosing and paying for their own children’s education,
parents in these countries overwhelmingly seek out practical academic
instruction and career training that will allow their children to become
economically successful.”15
I believe this area requires further reflection. In practice, whatever demands parents make for their children’s curriculum, private
schools often seem to be heavily constrained by government curricula, particularly in the developing world. Following government
curriculum and associated assessments is usually a condition of official school recognition, and recognition is required for a school’s students to take exams and so on.16 Further research and development
are needed to explore Coulson’s ideas in this area. For example, to
what extent are private schools currently subject to government curriculum with its potential for indoctrination? And to what extent
can private schools break free from this curriculum, experimenting
with their own ways of meeting parental demand? These important
questions, which Coulson’s work has illuminated, require careful
deliberation.
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Comparisons between Government and Market Systems of
Education
When pointing to private education in his work on curriculum and
indoctrination, Coulson was very clear on private schooling’s virtues:
“The biggest lesson of the research comparing alternative school governance structures is that fee-charging market schools out-perform
government schools . . . in academic achievement, cost-effectiveness,
facilities condition and maintenance, gender equity, and enrollment
growth.”17 He presented the evidence for this most simply and lucidly
in his article “Comparing Public, Private, and Market Schools: The International Evidence,”18 which takes further the arguments raised in his
contribution to the Cato volume What America Can Learn from School
Choice in Other Countries.19
The key insight of his article is his realization that evidence from
government-imposed school choice programs in America and elsewhere cannot inform our understanding of what real market education can offer. No American school choice program has created “a
truly free and competitive education marketplace,” typically because
too many regulations have been imposed on both the supply and the
demand sides.20 School systems, even those featuring some aspects
of school choice reforms, Coulson realized, “differ from free and
competitive markets in crucial ways,” including lack of “profit, price
change, market entry, and product differentiation.”21 There are, in fact,
education systems that approximate real markets much more closely
elsewhere in the world, and Coulson turned to them in his review of
the evidence.
One approach is to look at how different nations—with different
mixes of public and private schools—perform on specific international
tests, such as the Program for International Student Assessment or the
Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study. But Coulson
rightly eschewed that approach, as “nations differ substantially in factors related to educational outcomes (e.g., wealth, culture, demographics)” and it makes little sense to assume that student performance on
these international tests “is due to that nation’s school system alone.”22
To overcome “the hurdle posed by cultural and economic differences
between countries,” Coulson proposed comparing “different sorts of
school systems within nations”23 (emphasis added). A study comparing private and public education within a country such as India, for
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instance, would avoid the problem of bringing in international differences in wealth, culture, demography, and so on.
Of course, such a study will only point to the relative performance
of public and private school systems within that nation and so will not
immediately be generalizable. However, Coulson argued that if similar
results are repeated across nations, then “we can be fairly confident that
the observed pattern is the result of the system itself” and not simply
geographical circumstance.24 With these considerations in mind, Coulson conducted a systematic literature review of all available evidence
comparing public and private schooling. His initial analysis covered 65
studies from more than 20 countries, with 156 separate findings in the
areas of academic achievement (as measured by student test scores),
efficiency (measured as academic achievement per dollar spent per
pupil), and parental satisfaction, as well five other factors that appear
less frequently in the literature.25 Using a simple “vote counting” procedure, Coulson showed that these studies demonstrate overwhelmingly
the advantages of the private sector in education: 106 studies showed
significant private-school advantage, 37 were statistically insignificant,
and 13 showed significant government-school advantage overall.
Coulson was not entirely satisfied with this result, however, as he
recognized that some of the studies may have featured private schools
operating under conditions of subsidy and/or heavy regulation, not in
genuine market systems. Eliminating those cases, he was left with 76
studies, which showed an even more striking private-market advantage: 59 studies were statistically significant in favor of markets, 13 were
statistically insignificant, and only 4 showed a significant government
advantage, using the same set of comparison characteristics previously
noted. Coulson summarized the findings thus:
In more than 150 statistical comparisons covering eight different educational outcomes, the private sector outperforms the
public sector in the overwhelming majority of cases. Moreover,
this margin of superiority is greatest when the freest and most
market-like private schools are compared to the least open and
least competitive government systems.26

One possibility that might make these findings misleading, Coulson
conceded, came from the potential for “selection bias,” which “occurs
when families choose public or private schools because of p
 ersonal
characteristics related to educational outcomes, and researchers fail
to control for those characteristics.”27 If more-motivated parents
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“disproportionately choose private schools, then the private sector will
enjoy an academic advantage that must be controlled for in order to
make a fair comparison between the sectors.”28
However, several of the studies did take selection bias into account.
Coulson pointed to examples from India, Indonesia, Colombia,
the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Thailand, Tanzania, and
Nigeria. Interestingly, the impact of controlling for selection bias is not
straightforwardly against private education, as might be anticipated. In
countries such as Tanzania and Indonesia, for instance, where access to
public secondary schooling is based on pupil achievement in primary
school, “controlling for selection bias tends to favor the private sector.”29
Moreover, selection bias may not be as large a problem as many commentators believe. Because the studies are of places where the vast majority of children go to private schools, the private schools dominate the
field. Coulson argued that commentators find it difficult to shake off the
notion “that private school families are fundamentally different from
public school families.” They assume that those using private schools
are “a small, elite pool of committed parents and that it is their commitment and not a private sector effect” that leads to the striking private
school advantage.30
If that commitment effect were correct, Coulson wrote, then “we
would expect the education market’s advantage over monopoly schooling to decline as private sector enrollment share rises, and eventually to
be eliminated or even reversed in cases where private sector enrollment
share exceeded public sector enrollment share.”31 If the private market
in education were serving most families, then “the impact of a small
elite of committed parents on its overall performance would be greatly
attenuated and perhaps erased.”32
The evidence seems to support this suggestion. Coulson pointed to
studies from urban Lucknow, India, for instance, where approximately
80 percent of the students were enrolled in private (aided and unaided)
schools, yet the private schools outperformed the government schools.
Similar results were found in Nigeria and in other Indian cities.
Here is an important and original idea that challenges the assumption
that selectivity bias skews the results of public-private comparisons:
When private schools are patronized by a “small, especially committed
elite,” then one would expect selectivity bias to enter the picture. However, when the vast majority of children are enrolled in private schools,
and the private schools still outperform government schools, then “it is
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no longer reasonable to ascribe the market’s advantage to some special
indefinable quality of a parental elite.”33
It is these kinds of educational markets—where a vast majority of
children, including the poor, attend private school—that Coulson
pointed to in his conclusion. He recommended The Beautiful Tree for
those readers “interested in learning more about these entrepreneurial
schools serving the third world poor.”34
As this was clearly an area that greatly interested and excited Andrew Coulson (it was the reason, for instance, that he finished filming
his school choice documentary in the slums of Hyderabad), let me conclude by summarizing some of the findings of my book and how the
research has developed since it was published.
The Revolution of Low-Cost Private Schools
I directed two major research programs, funded by the John T
 empleton
Foundation, on low-cost private schools. The first took place between
2003 and 2005 and the second between 2011 and 2013. This research
showed private schools burgeoning in poor communities across sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia rather than existing only to serve elites—
the point that Andrew Coulson noted. The first research program explored India (Delhi and Hyderabad), Kenya (Nairobi), Ghana (Ga, near
Accra), and Nigeria (Lagos State), as well as rural India (Mahbubnagar)
and China (Gansu Province). The research found that the majority of
schoolchildren (up to 75 percent) in urban and peri-urban communities
attended low-cost private schools, while a significant minority (about
30 percent) in rural communities attended private schools.
The sheer number of low-cost private schools is staggering. In India
alone, I estimated there were approximately 300,000 at the time of the
research, and the number has likely grown. One state in Nigeria, Lagos,
has an estimated 14,000 low-cost private schools. We tested about 24,000
children in mathematics, English, and one other subject and typically
found that children in low-cost private schools outperformed those in
government schools, even after controlling for family-background variables and possible selectivity biases.35
The second study extended the focus of research to conflict and postconflict countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In Liberia, we conducted a
school survey in seven major slums in Monrovia, followed by a household survey in one of those slums.36 The survey found 432 schools serving a total of 102,205 pupils in the seven slums. Of these schools, only
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two were government-run. Schools run as for-profit ventures made up
57.2 percent of all schools found, with 60.7 percent of all pupils. The
rest were run by various nonprofit secular and religious groups. The
household survey showed that, for children aged 5 to 14, 8.2 percent
were in government schools, 71.0 percent were in private schools, and
20.9 percent were out of school.
In Sierra Leone, we set out to find all schools serving children of
primary-school age in Western Area (both the Western Area Rural district and the Western Area Urban district).37 We tested more than 3,000
“primary 4” (4th grade) students in English and mathematics in a random sample of schools, stratified by management categories, and we
created multilevel models to analyze the data. Government was found
to manage 10 percent of all schools, with 90 percent managed by the
private sector. For-profit schools made up the largest proportion of
schools (33 percent of all schools), followed by established churches
(17 percent).
Regarding achievement, we found that an average child was predicted to perform better in private than in government schools. For English (reading), an average boy in a government school was predicted to
achieve 15.5 percent of total answers correct, while a girl would achieve
10.8 percent. In a low-cost private school, the boy’s result would nearly
double; the girl’s result would nearly triple, to 30.2 percent in a forprofit school or 29.0 percent in a nonprofit school.
In South Sudan, we carried out a survey to locate all schools in the urban and peri-urban areas of Juba.38 We found 199 schools serving a total
of 88,820 pupils at nursery, primary, and high school levels. The private
sector accounted for 73.9 percent of the schools and 62.6 percent of the
pupils. The largest category of schools by number was private proprietor schools (28.1 percent) followed by government (26.1 percent).
Low-cost private schools are affordable to the poor—not surprising
given their ubiquity in poor areas. We defined affordability on the basis
of what poor families could afford for all their children if they were to
spend a maximum of 10 percent of their income on school fees and associated costs.39 “Lowest-cost” and “low-cost” private schools are those
affordable to families on, respectively, the internationally recognized
$1.25 and $2 per person per day poverty lines (at 2005 exchange rates
and purchasing power parity). In the slums of Monrovia, Liberia, for instance, the vast majority (73.7 percent) of private schools we found were
“lowest cost”; in our Sierra Leone study, 66 percent of for-profit private
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schools were “lowest cost.” Indeed, the cost to parents of sending a
child to a government school averages (in the Monrovia, Liberia, study)
about 75 percent of the cost of sending a child to a low-cost private
school once all of the extra costs of schooling—uniforms, books, exam
fees, transportation, and so on—are taken into account.
All of the research shows a considerable success story. Even in some
of the poorest, most conflict-affected places on earth, educational
entrepreneurs have created low-cost private schools, which are serving
the majority of children in urban areas, and serving them better than
the public schools. To me—as to Andrew Coulson—the existence and
success of these low-cost private schools was something to be greatly
celebrated.
However, this position is controversial. The literature reveals a hugely polarized debate about the significance of low-cost private schools.
Why the controversy? A decade ago I used the phrase “de facto privatization” to describe the low-cost private school movement; the phrase is
now in wide circulation.40 But the term carries huge significance. Privatization, the assigning of businesses or services to private rather than
state ownership, is normally considered a top-down approach (governments “denationalize” particular industries, such as railways or steel).
“De facto” privatization, in contrast, occurs from the bottom up, as
when the people themselves, not the state—indeed, often against the
wishes of the state—engage in reassigning education to private rather
than state control and ownership. Controversy seems to stem from the
realization that the people themselves are embracing a solution to educational delivery that differs from the accepted wisdom that has been
in place since 1948 (with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
The accepted wisdom was that government should be the supplier of
schools to the poor. A lot is at stake if the people themselves appear to
be rejecting that consensus.
Coulson was no stranger to this controversy. He engaged in the public debates in a surefooted and engaging manner, using research-based
evidence to fuel his arguments. The debates continue. For instance, I recently published an article about a paper that employed what is widely
hailed as the gold standard for research in this area, a “randomized controlled trial” voucher experiment, in Andhra Pradesh, India.41 The findings showed that the poor village children given vouchers for private
schools performed no better than those left behind in the government
schools, although there was some consolation that the private schools
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achieved this result for a third of the cost of the government schools.
However, investigating closely, I discovered that different tests in mathematics and science had been used for children in the public and some
of the private schools, with questions posed in English for half of the
private schools, but in Telugu, the regional language, in public schools.
This violated a fundamental principle of randomized controlled trials—
that everything should be the same apart from the intervention tested
(in this case, the voucher)—and so invalidated the results.
However, tucked away in the research paper was evidence that when
children were given the same tests, and when the Telugu-medium private schools were compared with the Telugu-medium public schools,
the private school children significantly outperformed those in government schools in all subjects. Not only were the private schools more
cost-effective, they also had higher achievement.42
I’m pleased that I managed to share these last findings with Andrew
Coulson before he died. Moving forward, I regret I’ve lost a magnificent
friend and sounding board to continue to engage in the debate, as further criticisms of market education will inevitably emerge.
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7. Measure Market Presence, or Few
Rules and Provider Neutrality:
Are the Differences Important?
John Merrifield

Andrew Coulson and I agreed on the need to increase openness to
alternatives to assigned public schools, the need for increased freedom
from regulation for education consumers and school operators, and the
need for market-based prices to inform and motivate schooling consumers and providers. Central planning has never worked, anywhere,
economywide or industrywide. Market-driven price change orchestrates decentralized planning. Moreover, we agreed on the importance
of truth in labeling, and that if we could start from scratch, it would
be best if nonrefundable tuition tax credits were the only government
intervention in the formal schooling industry.
Alas, since school system reform can’t start from scratch, we often
disagreed, which was both frustrating and productive. I believed that
our strong differences of opinion were an important reason to define
joint projects. You can learn a lot more from honest, well-meaning,
well-informed disagreement than from people with mostly similar
worldviews. I knew that Coulson was not an ideologue or paid political
hack defending a position out of institutional or personal self-interest.
Our disagreements on policy tactics were based on principle, not pique.
He wanted the best outcome for our country, and for schoolchildren
everywhere. I knew that he would provide a stern test of my ideas and
interpretations of evidence. So, we had a war of ideas, and I proposed
some coauthorships. I learned a lot from jousting with Andrew Coulson.
A discussion of our disagreements has value in its own right, because
it bears on the crucial tactical choices school system reformers must
make. And specifying the substantive bases of our disagreements has
value in this tribute volume because Coulson and I tussled over core
issues that deserve a lot more scholarly attention. Those general tactical
disagreements set the table for our disagreement on how to measure
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the likely key underlying conditions of high performing school systems
that is the main subject of this chapter.
After starting with a focus on how to create an Education Freedom
Index (EFI), Coulson developed two versions of what became the Cato
Education Market Index (CEMI). I continued to pursue the EFI concept: a measurement of freedom from constraint without regard to the
nature of the choices made. I will get to the EFI vs. CEMI tussles, and
the specifics of the key differences. But first I want to set the scene with
our overarching discussion of how best to pursue a transformation
from our current, centrally planned, gold-plated, school system disaster, to a high-performing, relentlessly improving system, with all of the
schooling options, public and private.
Sufficiency of Nonrefundable Tuition Tax Credits
Coulson and I agreed that nonrefundable tuition tax credits are an
appropriate government intervention in the formal schooling industry,
but we did not agree on how to get there. To Coulson, the answer was
obvious: implement a nonrefundable tuition tax credit in every school
system, which in the United States would mean in every state. I said
that would be fine, but it would not be transformational given our starting point—specifically the presence of a public school system offering
tuition-free schooling funded at the cost of over $13,000 per pupil, per
year. A nonrefundable credit would not defray tuition costs very much
for most households, even those with only one school-age child, so a
nonrefundable credit would not appreciably erode the school finance
monopoly that makes it so difficult for a private school to compete. A
nonrefundable tuition tax credit would not greatly increase the demand
for private schooling, and thus it would not adequately create new
schooling options or increase competition from new private schools. I
argued that the tuition tax credit for most households would be too
small to be a catalyst for school system transformation.
I concluded that tuition tax credits would be insufficient given my
assumptions about the limits that would arise from the traditional tax
liability base for credits, generally, and from thinking about where immediate fiscal savings would accrue when children left their assigned
public schools. The maximum nonrefundable tax credit amount would
vary by state, with the smallest and thus least transformational presumably in the lowest tax states. Some states have low property taxes, and
some have no state income tax. Except for high-income households in
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high-income-tax states or high-property-tax states, even a 100 percent
refund of the current state and local tax liability would provide only
a partial tuition discount for one enrolled child. A nonrefundable
tuition tax credit is nearly meaningless to low-income, and hence
low-tax-liability, households.
Coulson had answers.1
The first was to extend nonrefundable tax credits to businesses and
households without schoolchildren for donating money to organizations that fund tuition vouchers for low-income families. On the need
for such donation credits, Coulson and I were in complete agreement.
Meaningful tuition tax credits would not be appropriate or politically
feasible without the donation tax credit complementarity. Many states
now offer such a nonrefundable tax credit mix as tax credit scholarships
(TCS), though the term “scholarship” is misleading. TCS-based tuition
grants are not restricted to children with superior academic skills. More
important, TCS programs help many families afford options than aren’t
available in the public school system. But scholarships have been too
scarce, and amounts too small, to be transformational. They have been
unable to attract significantly increased investment in private schools.
The second answer was a proposal to include multiple state and local
taxes in the liability basis for the nonrefundable tax credits: the property
tax revenue of school districts plus state income and sales tax, and perhaps other state and local taxes. But even with the addition of credits
based on seemingly unlikely nonschool local government (such as city
or county) taxes, the possible annual nonrefundable credit was still well
below the tuition levels of many private school options.
The struggle to adequately fund school choice from credits against
current state and local tax liabilities exists because households directly
pay only part of the taxes that finance the public school system. They also
indirectly pay through school taxes on businesses. And the taxes that
households directly pay, they pay their entire lives, not just when their
children are in school, which is when they would be eligible for the
nonrefundable tuition tax credit Coulson proposed. Credits against the
taxes families pay to finance the public school system just while their
children are in school can yield only a small fraction of the total tuition
cost. I’m slow sometimes, so it took me several years—obviously too
late—to propose to Coulson that we fully flesh out how one might enlarge the ultimate credit amount by tuition tax credit banking. Thus,
for example, a taxpayer/parent who spends $5,000 per year on tuition
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for 10 years could earn a $2,000 nonrefundable credit for 25 years, with
many of those years coming after the child has left school.
Public school finance is an implicit loan that families repay through
continued school tax payments after their children are out of a school.
A bankable tuition tax credit would do the opposite. Families would
provide the funding up front, perhaps through a real loan, and then
get repaid with lower taxes later on. I said that I was sure that the possible annual tuition tax credit of most households would be too small
to be a catalyst for school system transformation. With tuition tax credit
banking, I believe the credit can be large enough to be transformational.
The Regulation-Following-Money Threat
The degree to which regulation of content and practices would follow
government money is a key part of the tuition tax credit debate and central to credible measurement of educational freedom. Coulson had an
encyclopedic knowledge of the many instances in which increased
government control of nongovernment schooling options followed
the introduction of government funding of such schools. He was also
well versed in the court cases ruling that vouchers and refundable tax
credits amount to government funding, while nonrefundable credits do
not. The courts see nonrefundable tax credits as giving taxpayers back
their own money, but they often view vouchers and refundable credits
as giving private—including religious—schools taxpayer money. Still,
there is considerable disagreement on how much government control
of schooling practices would follow different means of leveling the financial playing field between public and private schooling options.
Government control does not follow many kinds of government
funding, and the government can already regulate private schools.
But Coulson was adamant that government—the political process—
was much more likely to refrain from debilitating regulation of private
schools if there were no taxpayer dollars to spur calls for “accountability.”
To secure that reduced regulation risk through nonrefundable tax credits only, most families in most states would still face huge out-of-pocket
tuition costs, which would keep many from opting for an alternative to
their assigned public school.
If bankable, nonrefundable tuition tax credits are not politically feasible, or still not large enough to induce transformational entrepreneurial
initiative, I’m willing to forsake the smaller regulation risk of nonrefundable credits, vouchers for education savings accounts that foster
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greater choice and increased market entry by entrepreneurs. Coulson
was not willing to forsake nonrefundable credits’ smaller regulation
risk. I suggested that we make an effort to measure the differences in
regulation risk or, more generally, the resulting differences in the level
of education freedom and conduciveness to a competitive school marketplace. A study of the determinants of education freedom, generally,
and regulation of schooling content and practices, in particular, would
have to wait until we had a measure of market openness to education
entrepreneurship, and the degree to which public and private school
operators were free from regulatory constraint. Enter the EFI.
Freedom of Choice
We started out with the name, Education Freedom Index (EFI), for
what we expected to measure. From the start, we disagreed on what
should be measured or valued in the 0–100 index. That led us to work independently and then return to discuss differences around a large Cato
conference table. Coulson and I assertively exchanged ideas. We must
have overwhelmed everyone else. On many key issues, no one else added their thoughts. The index name changed at the conference table when
I noted that Coulson’s template directly measured how much of formal
schooling at the primary and secondary level—K–12—was produced
privately, through markets. I argued that the result of Andrew’s survey
questions and calculations could not be called an EFI because the proposed calculations would value some choices more than others; an EFI
should be neutral as to how families used their freedom. The EFI should
not be larger when families have a lower propensity to choose public
schools. Freedom from constraint would likely lead to increased reliance on markets to determine what kinds of instructional approaches
to make available, where, how they would be produced, and for whom.
But I believed the index should directly measure freedom from constraint and government neutrality about the provider, not the likely
outcomes of freedom and a level playing field between public and private providers. For example, the school choice expansions created by
mostly narrowly targeted programs, so far, have largely seen the vast
majority of families choosing their assigned public school. Exactly how
many of the program-eligible children stay in their assigned public
school affects the CEMI value, but not the EFI value.
So, I argued, if a policy change significantly lowers the cost of moving a child from the assigned public school to a private alternative,
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a low number of transfers to the private alternative should not reflect
negatively in a true EFI. If an index did penalize opting for the assigned
public school, it should be called an education market index (EMI).
Coulson agreed, adding a “C” for Cato (CEMI). I also pointed out that
appropriate reforms would take many years to turn the status quo into
full-fledged markets; Coulson developed a “policy-rating” version of
the CEMI to measure the extent to which a new or proposed policy
would create the conditions that would support full-fledged markets for
formal schooling options. My EFI is most similar to the “policy-rating”
CEMI, but significant differences remain.
To his great credit, Coulson set the scene for the specific disagreements. He stated a well-developed case for his policy and measurement
protocol preferences, for example, in his book Market Education: The
Unknown History.2 I critiqued some of the Market Education–based interpretations. Then, mostly on the basis of my book The School Choice Wars
and my Edgewood Voucher Program assessment, I offered different interpretations—which Coulson nearly always rejected.3 Likewise, he was
first with an extensive, brilliant measurement template. His survey
questions were the starting point for the mostly similar, sometimes
identical, 49 survey questions in the original EFI. Later, to spur data entry activity, I condensed the original 49-question EFI template down to
the current 16 questions. Because of his leadership, I am naming the online EFI calculator the “Andrew Coulson Education Freedom Index.”4
As the developer of nearly all of the key starting points for revision
and fine-tuning, he deserves the honor. I recognize, however, that since
the EFI concept was not Coulson’s first preference for the underlying
concepts, the name change might send him spinning in his grave. To
guard against that, and for solid scholarly reasons, I hope we can do
some extensive EFI–CEMI empirical comparisons, such as examining
explanatory variables for key effects like academic outcomes and rate
of school system change.
Index Specifics—EFI vs. CEMI—Similarities and Differences
The aim of this section is to highlight key differences between the two
indexes. The computational and conceptual details are in the publications that describe the EFI and CEMI.5 How the computational strategy aggregates the component scores into an index number between
0 and 100 is one of the key differences. The CEMI value results from
multiplying the producer and consumer freedom scores, which are
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themselves the products of individual producer and consumer freedom
components:
CEMI = Competitive Density * Incentives for Innovation
and Expansion * Incentive for Efficiency * Entry and
Operational Freedom * Incentive for Parental Responsibility *
Parental Freedom of Choice * 100
Multiplication of scores means that any low score, especially a zero,
makes the other factors meaningless. As a conceptual matter, that
multiplicative aggregation strategy is clearly appropriate for some
school system features, such as “entry and operational freedom,”
which includes the barriers to private school start-up and regulation of
schooling personnel and content. Certainly, other high scores are virtually irrelevant to market functionality if the “entry and operational
freedom” value is low.
But many of the other CEMI components can be low without coming
close to extinguishing freedom or substantially curbing market activity. That is, low scores for some of the factors in the CEMI equation
should not zero out a measure of market activity. For example, a universal tuition voucher amount, or an annual education savings account
deposit, close to the average tuition cost of private schools would zero
out “Incentive for Efficiency” and “Incentive for Parental Responsibility,” and thus yield a zero CEMI. That result occurs in the computation
of the CEMI even though “subsidies to private schools can also have a
separate, positive impact on market vigor if they increase competition
between public and private schools by diminishing any existing subsidy discrimination that favors the government-run schools.”6
As Coulson found in the research that yielded Market Education,
school systems perform better when parents have some “skin in the
game”—when there is a substantial out-of-pocket cost associated with
a school choice. But the multiplicative aggregation of components with
unequal importance exaggerates the importance of skin in the game
and other important, but not critical, factors.
The EFI summary value between 0 and 100 arises from the addition
of component values. Since each component is clearly not equally important, the EFI directly addresses the weighting uncertainty problem
(unknown W1 to W8) that many other indices ignore by implicitly
assuming equal weights.
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EFI = (W1 * EBS) + (W2 * PDI) + (W3 * APC) + (W4 * MSTAB) +
(W5 * FTM) + (W6 * MREG) + (W7 * OPC) + (W8 * PAIS)
My journal article on the EFI describes several ways of dealing with
weighting uncertainty, including deriving the EFI value for all possible
combinations of all credible weights, and then publishing the minimum,
maximum, and average EFI value derived from that process.7 The online EFI calculator derives two of those.8 The first is weighting based
on my judgment, which means the following weights: 24 percent (W1)
for formal and informal factors that would undermine entrepreneurial
initiative (EBS: entry barriers); 24 percent (W2) for factors that would
limit product differentiation (PDI: for example, rules requiring particular textbooks or the same curriculum elements everywhere); 20 percent
(W3) for absence of price control (APC); 16 percent (W4) for market
stability (MSTAB: degree of legislative or legal jeopardy); and 4 percent
each (W5 to W8) for freedom through mobility (FTM), miscellaneous
regulation (MREG: not schooling content or personnel), out-of-pocket
cost (OPC), and parent information system (PAIS). The second thing the
EFI calculator derives is reconfigured components to create a credible
equal weights scenario.
The EFI takes account of constraints on the potential to earn a profit,
but not the extent of actual profit seeking. The CEMI varies with the enrollment of schools aiming to earn a profit. The fully adjusted EFI takes
account of the rarely recognized toxic combination of price control and
potential profit. That combination creates a “negative freedom” that is
evident, but not widely recognized, in U.S. chartered public schools.
Because chartered public schools suffer price control (zero price for customers and whatever the state formula specifies for the school operators), shortages are widespread and large—a situation that empowers
school operators to cut corners, often scandalously, to increase profit or
revenue available for additional disbursements. Quality reduction is a
well-established outcome of the persistent shortages (widespread, long
waitlists) that result from price caps below the market-clearing level.
When the resulting unhappy customers leave the school, they are readily replaced from the waitlist. Quality reduction is a tempting producer
response to persistent shortages because, up to a point, cutting corners
reduces costs, but not revenues.
The EFI’s out-of-pocket-cost (OPC) component addresses the parental skin-in-the-game issue. OPC addresses the schooling access versus
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parental responsibility tradeoff created by changes in the out-of-pocket
cost of schooling. This includes costs like tuition due on top of taxes (for
some private schools) that must be paid regardless of school usage or
the school chosen. Pending a research effort to measure that tradeoff,
I specified 50 percent as the freedom-maximizing out-of-pocket cost.
That means the EFI implicitly assumes that an OPC change from 0
to 50 percent improves parental responsibility via more family skin
in the game, and outweighs increased financial stress from increased
out-of-pocket costs, increasing overall freedom. From 50 to 100 percent
OPC (no subsidy), the effect of less access to private schooling dominates the effects of further increases in skin in the game. Obviously, on
the basis of my “best guess” weight of 4 percent, and Coulson’s willingness to zero out the CEMI on the basis of minimal parental skin in the
game, that treatment of parental out-of-pocket cost is a major CEMI–EFI
difference. I’d argue that even with no skin in the game, many parents
would still very carefully choose a school for their children, and relatively small percentages of careful choosers are sufficient to foster a
high level of market competitiveness, including careful attention to the
nature of consumer preferences.
The EFI addresses the criticality of low barriers to entrepreneurial
initiative by also using the entry barrier score, which directly accounts
for 24 percent of the EFI value, as a weight for scoring anything pertaining to private schools. For example, price control only has its full W3
value (best guess = 20 percent) if there are no formal or informal barriers to entrepreneurial initiative. In other words, absence of price control
does not increase the EFI value much if huge difficulties sustaining a
private school (e.g., onerous regulation of registration requirements or a
public-school, public-finance monopoly) severely discourage entrepreneurial initiative. Likewise, minimal regulation of private school materials, personnel, and curriculum does not create much useful freedom
if the public school finance monopoly amounts to a huge private school
entry barrier.
EFI’s measure of market stability (MSTAB) is another key EFI–CEMI
difference. A stable basis for market activity is a clear prerequisite of
producer freedom. In general, the rule of law provides that stability.
Potential entrepreneurs come forward when they know that the courts
will enforce their contracts. In the context of school system change, perceived stability exists when laws provide, for example, a more level
playing field between public and private schools. That would include
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laws establishing universal vouchers or tuition tax credits or education
savings accounts with annual values near the per-pupil funding level of
public schools if those laws seem likely to survive legal challenges and
attempts at legislative repeal. Uncertainty will proportionately curb entrepreneurial initiative.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
Andrew Coulson was a brilliant man and a passionate scholar. We
agreed on the big things but often bumped heads on tactics and analytical methods. Ultimately, that creative tension will turn out to be much
more important than if we had agreed. With his terribly premature loss,
the world may never realize the school system reform so desperately
needed nearly everywhere. I hope that the rest of us can benefit from his
considerable contributions to the discovery of critical facts and his work
to develop productive ways to interpret them, and we can adequately
move the debate forward without him. It’ll be tough.
The two areas on which I worked with Coulson will likely be critical
to how and whether we achieve productive school system reforms in
enough locations that they eventually spread to the places most hostile
to such reform. The first is determining the appropriate policy vehicle for
eroding the public school system’s public finance monopoly, and thus
substantially leveling the playing field between the government-run
schools and truly independent schools. A bad choice might result in
an outcome worse than smaller academic and economic gains. It could
cause abandonment of productive pathways to school system reform.
The second is the measurement of market presence—or freedom—in
formal schooling for children. Coulson provided the basis for his focus
on market presence through the CEMI, and for my focus on the presence
of freedom, regardless of the degree to which increased freedom leads
to increased market accountability in the provision of formal schooling
to children. We need a CEMI or EFI to establish the importance of market presence, and maybe freedom, to school system effectiveness and
related economic and political outcomes. We may need both.
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8. Toward Education Consistent with
Freedom
Neal P. McCluskey

If you were to start an education system from scratch for a pluralist
country dedicated to liberty, would you likely determine that the
government should run the schools and decide what all children will
learn? Probably not. Yet that is exactly what the United States has done,
along with numerous other countries ostensibly committed to freedom. Indeed, many no doubt well-intentioned education thinkers have
asserted that such a system is essential to a free society.
Andrew Coulson knew better and attacked such thinking head-on.
Coulson fought for school choice—the only education system truly
compatible with liberty and peace—to maximize freedom not just for
students, but for all Americans. As much as test scores, efficient spending, taking quality to scale, and all the other things education reformers
obsess over, liberty was essential to Coulson.
Public schooling defenders often say that public schooling—government schooling—is an indispensable American institution, as if it were
a God-given fact, especially when they perceive threats from school
choice. When Betsy DeVos, a committed backer of choice, was nominated to be President Donald Trump’s secretary of education, American
Federation of Teachers president Randi Weingarten attacked her in a
New York Daily News op-ed as a “grave threat to what made America
great”: public schools. Weingarten rhapsodized that public schools are
“the places where we prepare the nation’s young people—rich, poor,
native- and foreign-born, and of all abilities—to contribute. They are
where we forge a common culture out of America’s rich diversity.”1
Political theorist Benjamin Barber has pronounced that public schools
are the “institutions where we learn what it means to be a public and
start down the road toward common national and civic identity. They
are the forges of our citizenship and the bedrock of our democracy.”2
Modern apologists for public schooling are not alone in arguing that
government-run schools are essential to molding unum from pluribus.
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Forging unity was the primary intention of leading advocates of public
schooling from the earliest days of the republic. Benjamin Rush, surgeon
general of the Continental Army and a leading light in Pennsylvania,
was a powerful voice calling out for public schooling to unify diverse
Americans. He did not sugarcoat his goal, writing, “Our schools of
learning, by producing one general and uniform system of education,
will render the mass of the people more homogeneous and thereby fit
them more easily for uniform and peaceable government.”3 Similarly,
Horace Mann, the first secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education and the “Father of the Common School,” wrote that in the public
schools “the affinities of a common nature should unite them [children]
together so as to give the advantages of pre-occupancy and a stable
possession of fraternal feelings, against the alienating competitions of
subsequent life.”4
Some evidence suggests that Americans broadly feel that public
schooling is a necessary, unifying institution. In 2001, political scientist Terry Moe detected what he called a “public school ideology . . .
a normative attachment to the public schools.”5 The basis for his conclusion was three survey questions he posed to the general public and
also to parents of school-aged children. Perhaps most directly telling
was the response to the statement, “The more children attend public schools, rather than private or parochial schools, the better it is
for American society.” Some 41 percent of nonparents agreed with
this—a large chunk of Americans—as did 40 percent of parents with
children in only public schools, and more than a quarter of parents
who used both public and private schools, or even exclusively private
schools!
What if the public schools were not working well? Apparently, for
the vast majority of Americans, even that would not matter: 67 percent
of nonparent respondents agreed that “the public schools deserve our
support even if they are performing poorly.” Note that bad public
schools are not just legally entitled to support. No, they also “deserve”
it. Such deep support may well stem from a belief—perhaps just a gut
feeling—that public schools are essential unifiers.
The problem is that the public schools are not unifiers. They may, in
fact, be net dividers. Noting the wide range of education before public
schooling, Coulson explained in his book, Market Education: The Unknown
History, that fearing “balkanization” in the absence of public schooling
gets the causal effect of force “exactly backwards”: it is requiring all
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people to support a single schooling provider, not educational freedom,
that ignites conflict and sows division:
Prior to the government’s involvement in education, there were
nondenominational schools, Quaker schools and Lutheran
schools, fundamentalist schools and more liberal Protestant
schools, classical schools and technical schools, in accordance
with the preferences of local communities. Some had homogeneous enrollments; others drew students from across ethnic
and religious lines. In areas where schools of different sects
coexisted, they and their patrons seldom came into conflict,
because they did not try to foist their views on one another.
They lived and let live in what were comparatively stable,
though increasingly diverse, communities. It was only after the
state began creating uniform institutions for all children that
these families were thrown into conflict. Within public schools,
many parents were faced with an unpleasant choice: accept that
objectionable ideas would be forced on their children, or force
their own ideas on everyone else’s children by taking control
of the system. It was this artificial choice between two evils
that led to the Philadelphia Bible Riots, the beatings of Catholic
children, the denigration of immigrant values and lifestyles in
public schools and textbooks, and laws—which today would be
viewed as utterly unconstitutional—forcing the Protestant Bible
on all families. The unpardonable treatment of black families
by the government schools, which persisted for over a century,
does nothing to enlighten this grim picture.6

Democratically controlled schooling, which is understood to mean
government-owned-and-operated education in which “the people” decide what the schools will teach, is inherently conflictual and unequal.
Barring unanimity of thought among all people of a district, state, or
nation—depending on which level of government is making the decisions—conflict is inevitable. You cannot teach both evolution and
creationism as true, or simultaneously mandate and make truly voluntary the reading of Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn or Toni
Morrison’s Beloved. One side has to win, and the other lose. The result
of this zero-sum game, as we’ve seen repeatedly, is social and political
fisticuffs.7
Such conflict is typically resolved in one of two, ultimately
unacceptable, ways: inequality under the law, or hollowed-out curricula.
When evolutionists keep creationism out of science classes, or a public school requires that students read about ol’ Huck Finn while keeping
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Beloved off of reading lists—when government chooses, as it must when
creating curricula, to elevate some people’s speech and downgrade
others’—then one side is inherently rendered superior under the law,
and one inferior. We have tyranny of the majority, or of a politically
powerful minority. We have inequality.
Perhaps less offensive to bedrock American values is the second
outcome: sidestepping potentially controversial topics. That option
may avoid or defuse social conflict, but as researchers such as Diane
Ravitch and political scientists Michael Berkman and Eric Plutzer
have demonstrated, the result is education stripped of meaningful,
rigorous content and engaging material. Government in that case
may treat everyone equally, but for students, that means equally
badly.8
Lest one take the conflict-and-inequality story too far, it is important
to note that for much of American history, public schools and districts
were generally not powder kegs just one inflammatory basal reader
away from exploding. But that was because public schooling reality
was miles away from the melting pot magic ascribed to it by backers.
For most of American history, people tended to live in small, homogeneous communities, and it was in those decidedly un-pluralist places
that schooling decisions were made. And when there was heterogeneity? As historian Benjamin Justice found when poring over records
from 19th-century New York, differing groups often created separate
districts or schools.9
Then there was what Coulson referred to at the end of the quotation
earlier in this chapter: the supposedly unifying public schools disgracefully excluded African Americans, and when blacks were finally allowed
to use the system, they were cordoned off in segregated schools, even
in such “enlightened” places as Boston, Massachusetts.10 And African
Americans were not the only racial or ethnic group shunted either de
jure or de facto into isolated schools: in some parts of the country, people
of Mexican or Asian heritage were confined to their own “separate but
equal” public institutions.
Choice Is Freedom, Minimized Compulsion Is More Freedom
If we wish to end schooling-driven social conflict and inequality,
we must open the gates of the gladiatorial arena in which Americans
are forced to fight. Rather than requiring everyone to fund public
schools, money should be attached to students and educators allowed
90

104856_Ch08.indd 90

4/4/17 8:04 PM

Toward Education Consistent with Freedom
to start and run schools as they see fit. As Coulson wrote in Market
Education,
When it comes to serving the needs of individual families, the
case for the superiority of educational markets over government monopolies is a strong one. Even some diehard advocates
of public schooling are willing to admit it. What prevents them
from throwing their support behind choice is not the fear that
parents will fail to get the kinds of schools they want, but that
they will succeed. A great diversity of schools would spring
up under a system of unhindered educational freedom, and
supporters of government schooling worry that such diversity
would lead to social discord and balkanization. While these
concerns stem from the best intentions, it is difficult not to be
shocked by their bald and bitter irony . . .
It is not the patrons of private Atheist Academies and Evangelical
Elementaries who tear into one another on the subject of evolution versus creation. It is not the private Afrocentric school, or
Orthodox Jewish school, or Classical Western Culture school
that sows dissension among families in the neighborhood. It
was not the private Catholic primary school of nineteenth-century America that drove its community into a frenzy by foisting
its version of the Bible on all the local children. It was, however,
the state schools of post-revolutionary France that set citizen
against citizen by favoring republican or royalist views according to the whim of despots; and it is the modern U.S. public
school system that factionalizes the population on issues of curriculum and religion, eating away at the fabric of the nation year
after year like the relentless action of waves eroding what could
be a peaceful shore.11

That choice would allow Americans to live more peacefully is difficult
to refute, though one school of thought holds that the conflict inherent
in public schooling is a feature, not a bug, forcing people to learn to
work out their differences.12 This is mistaken. Not only is winner-takeall conflict divisive by its nature, but also history is clear that immigrants—the primary “other” that public schools have been intended to
assimilate—will adjust to and adopt broad American culture and values
on their own, because doing so is the key to succeeding. People are simply more comfortable, and better able to earn a living, when they can
speak the common language, and when they adopt shared American
culture. When this assimilation happens at the individual and family
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level, it can occur at a rate that is gradual—not shocking and destructive—allowing people to slowly take on the new while preserving what
they most value of the old.13 When government tries to impose it, in
contrast, the result is not just conflict but fracturing of families—the
younger generation is taught to reject the values and culture of their
parents—and sometimes bitter resentment.14
That said, there is another important objection to choice, and it is consistent with the reason for backing choice: some forms of choice compel
support of ideas and beliefs that some—maybe most—taxpayers may
find troubling, even abhorrent. Preventing such compulsion is the justification for the many “Blaine” amendments and “compelled support”
clauses in state constitutions that have sometimes thwarted choice
programs.
Blaine amendments have their roots in sometimes bigoted 19thcentury politics targeting Roman Catholics: Sen. James G. Blaine (RME) wanted no public funding ever to go to Catholic schools trying to
survive against Protestant public institutions. Nonetheless, in theory,
they can serve a laudable goal. As Thomas Jefferson warned in the
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, “To compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical.”15 Blaine amendments stand
against such compulsion, at least when it comes to subsidizing religious
institutions, though by blocking funding only to religious institutions
they ultimately discriminate against religion.
To be clear, freedom would be greatly expanded were, say, all children
to receive vouchers in the amount of their share of public schooling dollars and educators were freed to create schools and other educational
arrangements according to their own pedagogical, moral, or other ideals. Parents could seek out schools with democratic control by students,
or Baptist schools, or classical academies, or classical Baptist academies
with democratic control by students. Educators offering different models could freely choose to work with parents seeking them. But the use
of vouchers compels any taxpayer opposed to any of those options to
supply funds to propagate opinions or beliefs to which he objects.
Coulson had a solution to the very real, bedrock worry about unjust
compulsion, one that created tension in the voucher-centric choice community when he advanced it: tax credits for individuals or corporations
that donate to groups providing private school scholarships. Reminding
readers in his report, “Forging Consensus,” that “compulsion has been
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the single greatest source of education-related social conflict in history,”
Coulson stated that no matter the sordid, anti-Catholic lineage of Blaine
amendments, “voucher programs force some citizens to violate their
convictions.” Then he asked the crucial moral question: “Is it right to increase parents’ freedom of choice at the expense of taxpayers’ freedom
of conscience?”16 His answer: absolutely not.
How do tax credits avoid that moral violation? With credits, no taxpayer sends money to the state, which then forwards it to parents to
choose schools. With personal use credits—which taxpayers receive to
offset the cost of private schooling for their own children—individuals
can freely choose a private school and are, essentially, relieved from
paying twice for education.
Donation credits are only a bit more complicated. Corporations or individuals who donate to nonprofit groups that furnish private schooling
scholarships receive credits on their taxes for some portion—preferably
all—of their donations. Again, what is essentially happening is that donors are getting credits for spending money on scholarships that would
otherwise have been used for government schools. Crucially, though,
people get to choose whether to donate, and, ideally, to what kinds of
schools: Roman Catholic, nondenominational Christian, Montessori, and
so on. Vouchers may enhance the freedom of students and their families,
but tax credit scholarships also enhance the freedom of taxpayers.
For defense of liberty—the fundamental American value—the best
possible government role is to provide tax credits for those who fund
private school choices. Tax credits also seem to be a more effective way
to expand choice than vouchers. As of the beginning of 2016, just shy of
400,000 children were using either vouchers, tax credit–eligible scholarships, or education savings accounts (ESAs) to attend private schools.
Of those choice vehicles, vouchers started much earlier than tax credits,
but only 166,579 students were using them; 225,834 had credit-eligible
scholarships, and 6,867 were recipients of ESAs.17
Not only are tax credits more consistent with liberty and much faster
growing than vouchers, Coulson found empirically that they are also
less prone to regulation.18 Likely in large part because they involve no
government funding, the impetus to attach regulations to scholarships
is not as strong as under vouchers. No taxpayer’s money is being used
at Bob Jones Elementary, or Ayn Rand High School, or even just a school
with low test scores. Schools attended by students using tax credit–
eligible scholarships simply do not receive state funds.
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Of course, even tax credits are connected to government. Giving credits
for schooling and not, say, buying ultra high-definition televisions, puts
the government’s thumb on the scale for education. But the tax credit
is by far the least coercive approach to help make true educational freedom possible. That is except, perhaps, for tax credit–eligible donations
to ESAs. ESA programs typically authorize state governments to put
money into accounts for individual children that can then be used for
education. ESAs expand on the freedom of vouchers and scholarships
by enabling parents not just to pick schools, but also to purchase individual courses, buy equipment for homeschooling, save for college, or
apply the funds to other educational uses.
ESAs by their nature produce more freedom than vouchers, enabling
parents to customize their children’s learning far beyond just choosing
a school. But they suffer from the same basic state funding problem as
vouchers: government gives Peter’s money to Paul. As a result, even
though he was battling cancer at the time, Coulson was a big part of
Cato’s work formulating tax credits for ESA donations. The resulting
paper—“Taking Credit for Education: How to Fund Education Savings Accounts through Tax Credits”—was authored by Jason Bedrick,
Jonathan Butcher, and Clint Bolick and published in January 2016, one
month before Coulson’s death.19 With its paramount focus on liberty, it
is a leading edge of Coulson’s educational freedom legacy.
Conclusion
The school choice debate—indeed, all education debates—seems to
quickly be reduced to simplistic questions of test scores or spending
levels—easy measures of immediate costs and narrow benefits. But
much deeper, and much more central to the role of schooling in a free
society, is how the education system brings us together . . . or pulls us
apart. Does it foster social cohesion while upholding the basic tenets
of American life: liberty, and equality under the law? Or does it do the
opposite? Alas, these questions are far too infrequently asked.
Perhaps the reason for the relative silence is a pervasive, unchallenged, and ultimately unsupported assumption: that pushing all
diverse people into a single, government school system will make
everyone get along and unify the country. It was an assumption that
Andrew Coulson rejected, both because he knew it was not grounded in
historical reality and because forced uniformity is a notion fundamentally incompatible with a harmonious and free society. “Democratic”
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public schooling by its very nature produces winners and losers, which
is utterly antithetical to equality under the law and inescapably incites
peace-destroying social conflict.
School choice is the key to escaping this most—let’s be frank—
un-American of education systems. Choice ends the high stakes, zerosum game by ensuring that the public can get educated without the
most politically powerful segment of society deciding for everyone else
what their children will—or will not—learn in the schools for which
all must pay. Andrew Coulson knew that choice is key. He also knew
that how choice is delivered matters immensely, and that vouchers—
even if a vast improvement over the status quo—still involve coercion
and violate freedom of conscience. So he championed a form of choice
with the greatest attendant freedom—tax credits for scholarship donations—and in the process advanced the choice vehicle that has, to date,
brought educational freedom to the most children. Andrew showed
that the principled and the practical—the most freedom for all, and the
most choice for families—go together. He championed the best way to
deliver education in a country founded on liberty.
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When Andrew Coulson passed away, numerous people from the
education policy world wrote pieces remembering him and his work.
We reproduce several of those testimonials here, with apologies for any
we missed.
Neal McCluskey and Jason Bedrick
Director (McCluskey) and then-policy analyst (Bedrick), Center for
Educational Freedom, Cato Institute
Early yesterday morning, after a 15-month battle with brain cancer,
Senior Fellow in Education Policy Andrew Coulson passed away. He is
survived by his beloved wife, Kay. Andrew was 48 years old.
Andrew’s death is very sad news for everyone at Cato, but especially
those of us at the Center for Educational Freedom, where Andrew was
the director—and an almost impossibly sunny colleague—for more than
a decade. Coming from a software engineering background, Andrew
seized on education reform—and the need for educational freedom—
not because he had spent a career in education, but because he saw a
system that was illogical, that was hurting society and children, and
that needed to be fixed.
And when Andrew wanted to fix something, he went to work.
Andrew hit the radars of everyone involved in education reform—
especially school choice—with his 1999 book Market Education:
The Unknown History, which captured exactly what he wanted everyone
to know about education. For much of history, Andrew made clear,
education was grounded in the free and voluntary interactions of teachers, students, and families—and it worked better for everyone than the
rigid, moribund, government-dominated model we have today.
Andrew was in the reform vanguard not just in laying out the historical, logical, and empirical case for truly free-market education, but
also in determining how, practically, to do that. Andrew was perhaps
the earliest and clearest voice calling for tax credit–funded choice in
preference to publicly funded voucher programs, which are themselves
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infinitely preferable to being assigned to a school based simply on
your home address. Tax credit programs, he argued, would be more
attractive—except to those who would lard regulations onto schools—
by breaking the connection between state money and school choices.
People would choose whether to donate to scholarships, and even to
which organizations or schools such donations would go, rather than
have the state hand out funds from all taxpayers.
Today, the wisdom of this choice mechanism has been borne out,
with tax credit–based programs starting later than vouchers, but now
exceeding total enrollment by about 53,000 students. And enrollment
through private educational choice programs of all types—vouchers,
tax credits, and education savings accounts—has ballooned since 1999,
when Market Education was published, from just a few thousand
children to nearly 400,000.
That is tremendous progress. But as Andrew would be the first to
proclaim, it is not nearly enough. Indeed, with an eye to pushing choice
much further, before he died, Andrew was putting the finishing touches on a documentary series vividly and humorously illustrating why
we need educational freedom, and the great benefits that even limited
freedom in education has produced. We hope Andrew’s labor of love
will be appearing on television sets across the country in the coming
months.
Andrew Coulson is no longer with us. Thankfully, his ideas remain,
and they will always illuminate the pathway forward.
Originally appeared at Cato-at-Liberty
Adam B. Schaeffer

Founder, Evolving Strategies, and former policy analyst, Center for
Educational Freedom, Cato Institute
Andrew J. Coulson was my friend and mentor in school choice policy.
He was a good, principled, brilliant, and funny man whom I will miss
deeply, along with many, many others. Andrew was so much more than
his work, but I’d like to focus here on that legacy he leaves behind, for
those who never had the pleasure of knowing him personally.
There is no one else besides Andrew Coulson that you must read to
discover what reforms we need in education and why they will work.
That is not hyperbole. There are many very sharp people who have
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contributed important thoughts on education reform, but you will get
everything essential that you need from reading through Andrew’s
collective works. In the near future, his final project—a documentary
series on the history and future of education—will be released and
should be added as mandatory viewing.
All the way through Andrew’s illness, he continued work on his passion: bringing freedom and excellence to education and opportunities
to children. I know he has made a huge difference already, but I hope
even more people read and learn from Andrew after his passing. If you
have even a fleeting interest in education reform, do yourself a favor
and read as much as you can by Andrew Coulson.
I was first introduced to Andrew in graduate school, about 12 years
ago. I’d written an article for National Review Online on vouchers,
playing off a West Wing episode to encourage conservatives and Republicans to provoke a wedge-issue fight for targeted vouchers and black
voters. Someone working in the choice movement emailed to compliment me on the article, but gently suggested I might be missing some
important concerns about school choice policy.
He attached a late draft of a paper written by Andrew for the Mackinac Center called “Forging Consensus.” I read it. And that was it. I was
convinced that education tax credits are the best option for remaking
our education system into one of freedom and excellence, one where
we can provide the best opportunities possible to all children. In terms
of practical impact, principle, public opinion, politics, and legal restrictions, Andrew made a thoroughly convincing case for consensus on
what the goals of school choice proponents should be.
More than a decade later, I’m more convinced than ever that Andrew
was correct then and is still correct now. His work directly inspired my
PhD dissertation, and I ultimately went to work for Andrew at the Cato
Institute. I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say that everything I’ve
written on education reform since then has been a recapitulation or an
extension of Andrew’s thinking and analysis.
Andrew was a fine thinker and passionate advocate. But, as many
have noted, he was also a kind man with a splendid sense of humor
and relentless optimism. He remained immovably committed to his
principles and the conclusions to which his great mind had led him.
But he always engaged with a sense of magnanimity and humor, never
bitterness or anger. Even when I made a good deal of trouble for him
with my lack of these qualities, Andrew stood by me. When he faced
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difficulties because of his principles, he always stood firm on those
as well.
I wish more of his qualities had rubbed off on me along with his
ideas. I had a great deal of difficulty maintaining my balance and optimism to continue in what I knew would be an extraordinarily long and
difficult battle. Andrew did not, or at least he never let it show or slow
him down.
Andrew’s passing is a great personal loss to those of us who knew
and worked with him. It’s an even greater loss to our collective movement to expand liberty and opportunity. But Andrew would never approve of ending on such a gloomy note. So I’ll keep in mind all the
wonderful gifts he’s left us—the memories and impact of his friendship
and the continuing inspiration and power of his ideas.
Originally appeared at Cato-at-Liberty
Lisa Snell

Director of education, Reason Foundation
I am so sad to hear of the passing of Andrew J. Coulson. It was my
great fortune to work in education policy with Andrew toward a better education for all kids and to know he always held the line and set
the pace for true markets in education. Market Education: The Unknown
History is the book I tell everyone interested in education to start with!
Originally appeared on Lisa Snell’s Facebook page
Thomas A. Shull

Adjunct scholar, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, and former senior editor
and senior director of research quality
Yesterday saw the early death of the Mackinac Center’s former senior
fellow in education policy, Andrew Coulson. Andrew was the victim
of brain cancer—a malignancy that he fought with all of the energy,
intelligence, grace, and good humor that characterized his life and work.
Andrew’s first profession was as a software engineer for Microsoft,
where he worked on the seminal operating system Windows 95. His
subsequent decision to enter the realm of education policy appears to
have been as felicitous for him as it was for the rest of us—a step that
allowed his vocation and avocation to become one.
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I first learned of his groundbreaking research on the success of private
markets in education from an unlikely source: the syndicated columnist
William Raspberry. Raspberry was a political liberal who championed
public schools, but who remained open-minded about their flaws. In a
remarkable review of Andrew’s book, Market Education: The Unknown
History, Raspberry gave a serious hearing to a thesis most pundits
would have rejected out of hand:
Coulson’s [Market Education] is a sweeping blow to those of us
who keep hoping the system that served earlier generations
reasonably well can be helped to overcome the effects of bad
policies, inadequate teachers, disengaged parents, and indifferent students to perform its magic yet again. He wonders if the
magic was ever there.

I recall my surprise as Raspberry seemed to grant the possibility that
private schools might be an answer to the problem of better universal
education, including education for the poor. At the time, this was a major concession, as I knew well. I was on the editorial board of the Detroit
News, and my essays in defense of charter schools and public school
choice were considered incendiary enough, despite both reforms’
reliance on government institutions.
I became acquainted with Andrew in 2004 during my first few days
at the Mackinac Center. As the center’s new senior editor, I heard that
the Detroit Free Press was questioning a figure in a column that Andrew,
then the center’s senior fellow in education, had written on the Detroit
Public Schools. Knowing firsthand how treacherous DPS data could be,
I called Andrew with some misgivings.
My apprehension quickly disappeared. Andrew was completely familiar with the federal data; he’d used it correctly; and he’d already
responded to the Free Press with his source for the number. His relaxed and friendly answers revealed an easy competence that I was to
encounter again and again in my work with him.
And what interesting work it was! Andrew wrote freely about
the role of private education markets in helping the Dutch and the
Japanese dominate world test scores, and the young people of India
dominate American telephone help centers. He simply pummeled the
argument that American students are outscored internationally because our schools are more democratic, and that our best and brightest compare well, even if our average students do not. He similarly
dashed the notion that your local school was really pretty good, and
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that it was just those bad ones in the newspapers that dragged the U.S.
average down.
Despite his religious agnosticism, he readily chronicled the superior
record of Catholic schools in closing the academic achievement gap between different races of students. His even-handedness showed again
when he profiled private K–12 scholarship institutions in Michigan,
prominently listing the Children’s Scholarship Fund, managed by the
Catholic Archdiocese of Detroit. Indeed, he was able to discuss the
hopelessly polarizing issue of religion and science in public schools
while showing respect for all sides of the debate.
Andrew was even-handed in his goring of oxen, as well. For instance,
while granting that charter schools had achieved some educational improvements, he forthrightly considered how charters helped push betterperforming Catholic schools out of the market. Similarly, after leaving
the [Mackinac] Center for the Washington, D.C.–based Cato Institute,
he published research showing that the California charter schools that
were most successful were not the ones growing and replicating.
Just as important, Andrew played a key role in forwarding the debate
among free-marketers between tax credits and vouchers as vehicles for
education reform. This was a sometimes pitched battle, yet he weathered it well and helped convince many in the movement of the superiority of tax credits—a stand the Mackinac Center championed early.
***
A key to all of this success was the unique temper of his commitment
to reform. Instead of expressing the intensity of his passion in invective, Andrew channeled his passion into an unusual blend of productivity, hard research, humor, and intellectual joy. I suspect this is what
Raspberry sensed in Andrew—a genuine goodwill that characterized
Andrew’s writing even as he was summarily proving you wrong.
And he was a delightful colleague. There was no one I enjoyed working with more than Andrew—a sentiment I suspect all his friends and
coworkers share. I recall, too, James Tooley’s words of gratitude in
the foreword to his remarkable and path-breaking book The Beautiful
Tree: A Personal Journey into How the World’s Poorest People Are Educating
Themselves. Andrew was the book’s editor, and Tooley simply wrote,
“Andrew Coulson has been the kind of editor and supporter an author
dreams of, through good times and bad.”
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***
Perhaps most tellingly, Andrew’s passion expressed itself in a willingness to learn. He stayed current with education research. He pressed
himself to master complicated statistical skills, most notably in his conceptually vigorous Mackinac Center study “School District Consolidation, Size and Spending: An Evaluation.” More recently, and almost
until his death, he bootstrapped himself up the learning curve of videography as he scripted, hosted, and produced a multipart video series
in the tradition of Milton and Rose Friedman’s Free to Choose.
The series, now being finished by a professional firm, asks and answers a simple question: Why don’t educational innovations that produce outstanding academic results simply sweep through our schools
in the same way that, say, iPods blew away the Walkman? If the final
product is anything like the rough cuts I’ve seen, the series will do him
justice, providing a showcase not just of his research, but of the man
himself.
Andrew was a generous and talented human being who worked for
freedom of choice for all children in education. This is surely tribute
enough, but in Andrew’s case, I must add that he was a good man, and
that he will be missed by virtually everyone who knew him. I join my
colleagues at the Mackinac Center in wishing Andrew’s family, friends,
coworkers, and, most particularly, his wife, Kay Krewson, every solace
in the days ahead.
Originally appeared at Mackinac.org
Darla Romfo

President, Children’s Scholarship Fund
It was only after hearing about Andrew’s death that I realized he must
have been no more than 30 when he wrote the very compelling book,
Market Education: The Unknown History. I knew when Ted Forstmann
gave me a copy to read in 1999 that it must be an important book and
that Andrew must be a very smart man since Ted, who was not one to
lavish undeserved praise on anyone, insisted on how essential it was
that I read Market Education before thinking I knew anything about education reform.
Andrew never disappointed. He was as nice as he was smart and
very much a team player.
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Rest in peace, Andrew. And may you find comfort, Kay, in the deep
affection so many have for Andrew.
Originally appeared at ScholarhipFund.org
Doug Tuthill

President, Step Up for Students
Andrew Coulson, the gentleman-scholar at the libertarian-leaning
Cato Institute, died yesterday of brain cancer. Andrew was 48.
I met Andrew in 2008, soon after I became president of Step Up for
Students. I’m sure he was curious about this liberal Democrat and longtime teacher and union leader who was now leading the country’s
largest private school choice organization.
Andrew and I spoke and exchanged emails frequently during my
first few years in this job. He was a brilliant thinker and extraordinarily polite. We shared a passion for freedom and equal opportunity, but
we did occasionally disagree, and those are the discussions I cherish
the most. He was sure that multiple Scholarship Funding Organizations strengthened tax credit scholarship programs, while I thought the
evidence showed the contrary. We ended up agreeing to disagree.
Andrew loved facts and logic. He had an engineer’s mind and was
relentlessly methodical in laying out his arguments. I appreciated his
commitment to civility and rationality in private and public discourse
and was always influenced, if not persuaded, by his reasoning and facts.
I especially appreciated Andrew’s empathy for our different roles. He
would regularly end our conversations by acknowledging that it was
easy to be an idealist while working at a think tank. He knew the political battles we were fighting in the Florida legislature required compromise, particularly in the area of how best to regulate choice programs.
Andrew’s death is a huge loss for our movement. I will always carry
our discussions with me. Hopefully I won’t let him down.
Originally appeared at redefinED
Larry Sand

President, California Teachers Empowerment Network
On February 7th, Andrew Coulson tragically passed away at age
48 from brain cancer. As senior fellow in education policy at the Cato
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Institute, he led the charge for free market reforms in education.
An unapologetic capitalist, he believed that the market would inevitably lead to better educational outcomes for all kids. And it was really
more than a belief. When the former computer engineer saw a problem,
he got busy tinkering under the hood to see what the problem was and
how best to fix it.
Coulson was a kind, brilliant man whose sense of humor was always
at the ready. His colleagues, Jason Bedrick and Neal McCluskey, found
him to be “almost impossibly sunny.” Even those coming from a very
different political/education angle appreciated and respected him. Reformer Doug Tuthill, a one-time union leader and self-described liberal
Democrat, said of him, “Andrew loved facts and logic. He had an engineer’s mind and was relentlessly methodical in laying out his arguments. I appreciated his commitment to civility and rationality in private
and public discourse, and was always influenced, if not persuaded, by
his reasoning and facts.”
Before I met Coulson in 2010, we had a brief email relationship, and
in 2009 he sent me a copy of “The Effects of Teachers Unions on American Education,” a paper he wrote for the Cato Journal. While the teachers
unions are quick to impress upon the world how much they do for teachers, they never get around to telling you specifics. Oh sure, they go on
about salary and benefits, but are their claims true? Coulson, using piles of
data, cut through union happy talk and left us with a very different view.
One of the claims of the teachers unions is that collective bargaining
is the life-blood of the union movement, but Coulson handily debunks
that. While collective bargaining has some effect on teacher salaries, it
is not nearly as great as is commonly assumed.
Coulson cites Stanford economist Carolyn Hoxby, who suggests
that the real union wage premium is somewhere between zero and
10 percent. Looking at rural Pennsylvania districts, economist Robert
Lemke found the public school union wage premium at 7.6 percent.
Cornell’s Michael Lovenheim looked at three Midwestern states and
concluded that “unions have no effect on teacher pay.” Coulson clarifies
that salary hikes have all undeniably occurred, but “they have occurred
in both unionized and nonunionized public school districts.”
So if salary hikes (and other collective bargaining goodies) haven’t
done much for union members, what have the unions accomplished for
their teachers? Coulson maintained that unions protect teachers from
having to compete in the educational marketplace.
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Another great Coulson contribution came in the one (that I am aware
of) interchange between Andrew and American Federation of Teachers
president Randi Weingarten, and it didn’t work out too well for the union
leader. In 2011, she wrote an insufferable op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in which she claimed that “Markets Aren’t the Education Solution.”
Coulson responded with “Dear Ms. Weingarten: I’ll Show You Mine If
You’ll Show Me Yours,” in which he wrote he’d “prefer to reach policy conclusions based on empirical research.” As Coulson pointed out,
Weingarten came to her conclusion “based on the testimony of a few foreign teachers’ union leaders and government officials who . . . run official
government education monopolies.” Coulson produced a most interesting chart that clearly shows how many studies favor education markets
over state school monopolies, and vice versa, in each of six outcome areas.
Not surprisingly, Weingarten didn’t (because she couldn’t) deliver a
rejoinder.
Coulson nailed the subject: “The NEA [National Education Association] and AFT [American Federation of Teachers] spend large sums
on political lobbying so that public school districts maintain their monopoly control of more than half a trillion dollars in annual U.S. K–12
education spending. And since both the U.S. and international research
indicate that achievement and efficiency are generally higher in private
sector—and particularly competitive market—education systems, the
public school monopoly imposes an enormous cost on American children and taxpayers.”
To further bring Coulson’s thesis to light, one only needs to look at
recent events. A small sampling:
In Los Angeles, the teachers union just asked for—and got—a
30 percent dues increase from its members. Its rallying cry? “We need
the money to battle foes of traditional public education.”
In Jefferson County, Colorado, a “parent” group led the charge to get
rid of a school board majority “with an extreme anti-public education
agenda.” In reality, it wasn’t parent-led, it was union-led. The National
Education Association and its state and local affiliates fully subsidized
an ugly and unfortunately successful campaign to unseat the NEAdubbed “right-wing” school board.
In New York City, the unions are on an eternal mission to cripple Eva
Moskowitz’s highly successful (nonunionized) charter franchise.
Coulson’s research led him to understand that we are “paying dearly
for the union label, but mainly due to union lobbying to preserve the
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government school monopoly rather than to collective bargaining.”
The good news is that because of Andrew Coulson and other school
choice warriors, that monopoly is unraveling, albeit very slowly. . . .
Losing Coulson was a blow for those of us who are desperately
trying to minimize the damage done by the teachers unions and the
government education monopoly. . . .
[His] life’s work must continue; it’s up to all of us to dig in and ensure
that [his] efforts have not been in vain.
Originally appeared at Unionwatch.org
Jay P. Greene

Distinguished professor and head of the Department of Education Reform at
the University of Arkansas
Many of you have heard the sad news that Andrew Coulson passed
away over the weekend. I thought I would share some personal
memories.
I first remember meeting Andrew and his wife, Kay, at a conference in
Toronto in 2000. I have to admit that he felt out of place. Here was this
guy without any university, think tank, or other affiliation and without
any formal training presenting on the history of markets in education.
And people did not typically attend these meetings with spouses. Who
was this guy?
As it turns out, this guy was a brilliant autodidact who “retired” after
being an early programmer with Microsoft to devote his time to studying and advocating for education reform. And he was really good at it.
The thing that struck me most about Andrew was his incredible optimism and quirky sense of humor. Liberty-oriented education activists
tend to be on the losing side of policy battles. It can be downright discouraging. But Andrew never seemed discouraged or became bitter. It was a
long game and he maintained a sunny optimism that freedom worked
better and people would eventually gravitate toward what worked.
He didn’t mind standing apart from the crowd. Just because donors,
policymakers, and other scholars were drawn to test-based accountability didn’t make Andrew feel like he had to join them. He even expressed serious reservations about certain methods of expanding school
choice, including charters and vouchers, that he thought would invite
excessive government regulation. I confess that I paid little attention
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to Andrew’s warnings back then, but I wish I had. The experience and
wisdom he obtained from studying history made him more sensitive
to these dangers than my narrow practice of social science. The autodidact had quite a lot to teach highly trained people like me. As it turned
out, choice reforms less prone to excessive regulation, like tax credit–
funded scholarships and ESAs [education savings accounts], are now
spreading rapidly—just as Andrew had expected and advised.
His humor often seemed to involve plays on words. For example,
I once posted to Facebook a photo of what I (incorrectly) captioned as
a “Golden Lion Tamarind.” He made some sort of joke about how the
dish was prepared. Some people of faith find small typos and errors
in language interesting because they think they can be unintentionally prophetic. I don’t know if that was Andrew’s motivation, but the
thought of me secretly wishing to eat a small monkey is pretty funny.
I will miss that quirky humor, but more important, I will miss his
wise counsel and good cheer. It’s a long game that must go on, but
something will be missing without Andrew as part of it.
Originally appeared at Jay P. Greene’s Blog
Michael Q. McShane

Director of education policy, Show-Me Institute
Every once in a while I stumble across a sentence and think man,
I wish I’d written that. One of my favorite examples of this, and a passage that I have quoted more times than I can remember, was written
by Andrew Coulson, the former director of the Cato Institute’s Center
for Educational Freedom, who passed away over the weekend. It came
from a book he contributed to in 2002. Here’s what he wrote:
We are all losers when our differing views become declarations
of war: when, instead of allowing many distinct communities
of ideas to coexist harmoniously, our schools force us to battle
one another in a needless and destructive fight for ideological
supremacy.

Andrew’s writing was the first to introduce me to the idea that school
choice might not just be good for kids academically, but could help us
create more harmonious communities. If we don’t have to fight each
other over what gets taught in history or science class, and we respect
our fellow citizens’ rights to instruct their children in the way that best
108

104856_Testimonials.indd 108

4/5/17 1:53 AM

Testimonials
fits their needs and their values, we can get along better with each other.
What a great idea.
We truly do stand on the shoulders of giants. God bless his memory.
Originally appeared at ShowMeInstitute.org
Matthew Tabor

Editor, EducationNews.org
Andrew Coulson, senior fellow of education policy at the Cato
Institute, has passed at the age of 48.
Cato colleagues Neal McCluskey and Jason Bedrick have detailed
Andrew’s contributions to how we think about markets in education
and how we can implement what we know through systems of choice.
And as Monday’s podcast testifies, he took an uncommon path.
Doug Tuthill at redefinED wrote that Andrew was methodical and
civil, and he influenced even those who disagreed with him. Jay Greene
of the University of Arkansas’s Department of Education Reform noted
Andrew’s humorous, witty, independent voice and his unique professional background. Nick Gillespie of Reason called him a “free market education radical”—a title carrying tremendous meaning when we
consider that what seemed so radical in 1999 is reality for hundreds of
thousands of kids in 2016.
Those 400,000 kids are writing their own tributes to Andrew Coulson
each day without even knowing it—or him.
There are few arenas of public policy that generate cults of personality quite the way education does. Tribalism and the desire to deify (or
demonize) people associated with a particular ideology are forces so
strong that throwing out a name or two has become shorthand for laying bare one’s entire educational belief system. The movers and shakers
in education jockey for position in that ecosystem, growing their brand
and habitually checking their rankings (Whose rankings? Anyone who
will rank them, and for anything) as they compel their supporters to
wage battles via proxy on social media and in school board meetings.
They sell, sell, sell. It doesn’t get us anywhere, and it’s uncomfortable.
Great for the individual, not so great for the problem they’re trying to
solve.
But a few people just plain work. They offer something new, explain why it’s better than what we’ve got, and make a case compelling
enough to fuel a movement. They shore up that case obsessively and
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make adjustments as evidence dictates. They understand the most important concept in sales: people hate to be sold to, but they love to buy.
They focus on creating intellectual products people want to buy, and
they have one overarching goal: moving the needle.
Andrew Coulson moved the needle.
Over a decade ago when I was transitioning into education policy,
someone suggested that I read Market Education: The Unknown History. I
won’t go over the contents of the book—you’ve either already read it, or
you’re about to—but I was struck by how much Coulson knew. This guy
has a command of virtually every topic under the sun, and what kind of
background allowed for that? A little Googling showed that, on paper, he
had no business writing that book. Yet there it was, and it was remarkable.
I found the PhD program I was in to be a useless grind, so I talked
with a professor/friend about how you can do something like this—
I had Market Education in my bag, so I held it out—without trudging
through tired, narrow academic channels. He said, “Well, really. . .you
can’t.”
I said, “You can.” I had a book to wave in the air that proved it. He
just had words and a slavish devotion to academia, so I chalked it up
as a win.
I skipped out on the PhD program after receiving an email that asked
grad students to classify the ethnicities of student research subjects by
their surnames for part of an education-related study. The pay was
$20/hour, but I wouldn’t have done that for $2,000/hour. I had proof
that I could advance my studies elsewhere, ethically, in a broad range of
fields, and come out all right—so I spent the next 10 years working on a
hundred different topics in a dozen different places. I was right and my
academic friend was wrong.
Years later, I crossed paths with Andrew Coulson himself through
mutual friends on Facebook. He proved himself to be a “gentlemanscholar,” as Doug Tuthill wrote. I never met him in person, but if I had,
I would have called him Mr. Coulson.
I saw credentialism dominate many different fields in many different
countries, enough so that I stopped caring where anyone went to school
or what letters they had before or after their names. Titles indicated
how or where someone spent a block of time, and anything beyond that
was a crap shoot. I hate credentialism.
Over the last year or so, I had friendly exchanges with Mr. Coulson—
and I followed along closely with the discussions I wasn’t a part of.
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They were master classes in wit, analysis, and advocacy. That I had access to them at a cost of nothing more than my time was an almostdaily lottery win. I half-stalked the poor guy professionally, but I wasn’t
about to waste the opportunity.
Through those back-and-forths about every facet of school choice and
its related disciplines, I gained an incredible amount of knowledge from
Mr. Coulson—and he exposed himself to be a good man. You can’t go
to school for that. You don’t apply, pay tuition, or take up space in a
classroom, and there’s no certificate at the end. It takes more time, more
work, and comes at a greater cost. It’s a lot harder to do.
A good man deserves a title that reflects the respect he’s earned rather
than a title he has forced the world to acknowledge because of some
series of endeavors that the world may or may not find value in. A good
man is a Mister. It’s the highest title anyone can hold.
I am, for the most part, tied to a desk and manning its requisite nerdbox. That is by choice. Mr. Coulson was limited lately by circumstance,
but we both seemed to have had the blessings of a few windows and
a little bit of time outside. I posted a photo of Grommit, the little rabbit with an off-center tail who marshaled our Cooperstown, New York,
lawn with an uncommon competence. Mr. Coulson regaled me with the
occasional update about Pamplemousse, the critter who does whatever
it is that critters do on lawns in the Pacific Northwest.
That’s the hard part about not taking that narrow, well-defined
path—there aren’t too many people who you know are doing something like you’re doing each day, then stopping to look out a window to
anthropomorphize bunnies. When you come across someone who you
recognize might spend 15 seconds of his day the same way you do, it
matters. When you come across someone like that who also takes you
seriously, it really matters.
I regret that Mr. Coulson didn’t know anything I’ve written here.
I never told him or anyone else. And I regret that I won’t have the
opportunity to change his mind on the only two issues of substance
that we disagreed on—the importance of sports in culture (I am a fan,
he seemed disinterested) and verb agreement with collective nouns
(I insist collective nouns are singular, while he said the British plural approach was supreme). Given another 60 or so years of debate,
I do believe I could have converted him on both scores—because I,
like Mr. Coulson, am something of a Sisyphean optimist with those
things.
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Andrew Coulson has passed, leaving behind an impressive body of
work and a legacy that’s a little part of the life force of hundreds of thousands of kids, their families, and their communities. Those numbers are
poised to multiply.
I still don’t know what, if any, official credentials he had. Someone might tell me, but I won’t bother to look them up. I don’t need
to. I know that he advanced the work of countless others, including mine, and helped lead a successful movement that decades ago
seemed impossible. He did it with humility, civility, and a seriousness
of purpose.
There are 1,300 words above, but five probably would’ve sufficed:
Mr. Coulson moved the needle.
Originally appeared at EducationNews.org
Joshua P. Thompson

Senior attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation
Liberty lost one of her staunchest defenders yesterday morning,
when Andrew Coulson passed away after a 15-month battle with brain
cancer. Andrew was a senior fellow in education policy at the Cato Institute. In that position, Andrew researched, published, and advocated
for school choice.
I have long been an admirer of Andrew Coulson’s work—even before I began my career at Pacific Legal Foundation. His book, Market
Education, has long been a staple on my bookshelf. Andrew and I first
crossed paths professionally when I posted a critique of an op-ed he
wrote in the Philadelphia Inquirer. His response led to a very interesting
back and forth. . . . Despite our minor disagreement, that conversation
led us to more closely follow the other’s work. We’d exchange emails
now and then, usually when one of us had something interesting to say
about school choice. For National School Choice Week last year, Andrew Coulson appeared with me on a PLF [Pacific Legal Foundation]
podcast. The podcast remains one of our most popular ever. Andrew
and I discussed a lot of the contemporary issues facing advocates of
educational freedom today.
It was during the preparation for that podcast last year that I first
learned about Andrew’s diagnosis. He was undergoing treatment at
the time and had to schedule the taping around his doctor visits. I, of
course, volunteered to postpone the podcast to a more convenient time,
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but Andrew insisted. He wasn’t going to let his treatment get in the way
of advocating for freedom.
Rest in peace, Andrew Coulson. “Thankfully, his ideas remain, and
they will always illuminate the pathway forward.”
Originally appeared at Pacific Legal Foundation Liberty Blog
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